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... car la dissimulation est des plus notables qualitez de ce siècle.
Montaigne, 15801
Zagorin’s fascinating study of dissimulation in sixteenth-century
Europe exhibits a curious lacuna. During this period widespread reli-
gious, ideological conflicts and increasingly intense efforts on the part
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Este trabajo ofrece un resumen de la doctrina
religiosa de taqiyya o disimulación en el islam
sunní, recurriendo a comentarios del Qur,an,
compendios de hadit, obras de ley islámica y
tratados de principios éticos. En las fuentes
andalusíes antes de la conquista cristiana apa-
recen discusiones acerca del concepto de ta-
qiyya y del de coerción (ikrah), ambos
exenciones legales, y algunas de ellas conti-
nuaron estando a disposición de los moriscos
y de los juristas norteafricanos que les acon-
sejaban. El análisis de estos materiales facilita
la interpretación de la fatwa que Ibn Abi
Yum,a al-Wahrani envió a los moriscos en el
año 1504 y particularmente la comprensión de
su tratamiento de la blasfemia bajo coacción.
Palabras clave: moriscos; disimulo; taqiyya;
coacción; ikrah; blasfemia; paronomasia.
This study provides an outline of the religious
doctrine of taqiyya or dissimulation in Sunni
Islam, drawing on Qur,anic commentaries, ha-
dith compilations, legal manuals, and ethical
treatises. Moriscos and the North African ju-
rists who advised them had access to discus-
sions of taqiyya and the closely connected
legal dispensation of coercion (ikrah) through
these sources, many of which were well-
known in al-Andalus before the Reconquista,
and some of which continued to be popular af-
terwards. Attention to this material helps one
to interpret the 1504 fatwa of Ibn Abi Jum,a
al-Wahrani to the Moriscos and in particular
his discussion of blasphemy under coercion.
Key words: Moriscos; Dissimulation; Taqiyya;
Coercion; Ikrah; Blasphemy; Paronomasia.
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of political and religious authorities to enforce doctrinal conformity
led to heightened and increasingly sophisticated uses of dissimulation,
drawing on disciplines of dissimulation formulated in theoretical terms
and sometimes recorded in manuals for neophyte dissimulators. With
the theoretical attention drawn to these matters also came a heightened
focus on language and its capacity to provide reliable evidence or, al-
ternatively, to conceal inner thoughts and convictions.2 The documen-
tary net of Zagorin’s research was cast quite widely, catching nearly
all the examples one might expect: the crypto-Judaism of conversos in
Spain and Portugal, the Nicodemism of Protestants in Catholic Italy,
the Catholicism of recusants in England, the mental reservation of the
Catholic doctors, and even the dissimulation of occultists and liberal
philosophers. Absent in this litany of notorious dissimulators, however,
are the Moriscos, the Muslims of Spain who underwent forced conver-
sions to Catholicism in 1501-02 in Castile and 1526 in Valencia, many
of whom continued to hold fast to their faith in secret until the final
expulsions of 1609-14. The oversight is odd, given that the predicament
of the Moriscos was quite similar, if not exactly parallel, to that of the
conversos, to whom Zagorin devotes an entire chapter. The omission
is all the more surprising when one notes that Zagorin in fact draws at-
tention to the existence of an Islamic discipline of dissimulation, termed
taqiyya, mysteriously claiming that it is instructive for his study but
not relevant to the European context: “An interesting case of dissimu-
lation for religious reasons is provided by a historical instance lying
far afield from Europe that nevertheless serves well to illustrate its char-
acter”.3 He alludes here to the tradition of dissimulation in the Shi,ite
sect of Islam.4 In a footnote, he half-heartedly justifies the omission of
Moriscos, attempting to distinguish them, on the grounds that they
often lived apart in separate villages and quarters and so did not need
to conceal their practices, from the conversos, who held higher posi-
tions in society and were more learned and better integrated into Chris-
tian society.5 The argument falls flat; although many Moriscos were
2 Maclean, Meaning and Interpretation in the Renaissance: The Case of Law. 
3 Zagorin, Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution and Conformity in Early Mod-
ern Europe, p. 3.
4 Zagorin, Ways of Lying, pp. 3-5; Donaldson, The Shi’ite Religion: A History of Islam
in Persia and Irak; Tabataba’i, Shiite Islam.
5 Zagorin, Ways of Lying, p. 41 n. 5.
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simple peasants, in Granada and elsewhere they included people from
all walks of life, including the privileged, the powerful, and the learned.
Many were highly integrated into Christian society, and even more
were under regular scrutiny and surveillance by neighbors as well as
the authorities. The main reasons for Zagorin’s omission are two: mod-
ern scholars’ conviction that the Moriscos, as Sunni Muslims, did not
have available to them the doctrinal option of taqiyya and the dearth
of published studies on taqiyya in Sunni Islam.
Many discussions of the Moriscos of Spain have suggested that they
consciously dissimulated with recourse to the Islamic legal concept of
taqiyya. 6 While it has always been recognized that large numbers of
Moriscos practiced dissimulation after their forced conversions in the
early sixteenth century, the ideas that this behavior was justified in Is-
lamic doctrinal terms and that the Moriscos who were dissimulating
knew of the Islamic legal dispensation to do so remain unevenly ac-
cepted and inadequately supported. This study investigates the theoret-
ical background of Morisco dissimulation through examination of the
well-known legal responsum issued by Ibn Abi Jum,a al-Maghrawi al-
Wahrani for the Moriscos of Granada in 910/1504 as well as other Is-
lamic texts that would have been accessible in Spain and North Africa,
arguing that taqiyya forms part of standard Sunni doctrine, overlapping
to a large extent with the related legal dispensation of ikrah “coercion,
duress, compulsion”. Sunni authors sometimes avoid use of the term
taqiyya itself, perhaps because of its association with Shi,ism in partic-
ular, but their detailed discussions of ikrah closely resemble discussions
6 Harvey, “Crypto-Islam in Sixteenth-Century Spain”; Harvey, “The Political, Social
and Cultural History of the Moriscos”; Harvey, Muslims in Spain, 1500-1614, pp. 60-64;
Harvey, “Una referencia explícita a la legalidad de la práctica de la taqiya por los moris-
cos”; Cardaillac, Morisques et Chrétiens: un affrontement polémique (1492-1640); Car-
daillac, “Un aspecto de las relaciones entre moriscos y cristianos: polémica y taqiyya”;
García-Arenal, Inquisición y Moriscos: Los procesos del Tribunal de Cuenca, pp. 101-02;
Vernet, “La exégesis musulmana tradicional en los coranes aljamiados”, p. 125; Chejne,
Islam and the West: The Moriscos, A Cultural and Social History, p. 24; Galmés de
Fuentes, Los moriscos (desde su misma orilla), pp. 108-13; Tueller, Good and Faithful
Christians: Moriscos and Catholicism in Early Modern Spain, pp. 62-63; Barletta, Covert
Gestures: Crypto-Islamic Literature as Cultural Practice in Early Modern Spain, pp.
xxviii-xxix; Perry, The Handless Maiden: Moriscos and the Politics of Religion in Early
Modern Spain, pp. 34-35; Miller, Guardians of Islam: Religious Authority and Muslim
Communities of Late Medieval Spain, pp. 114, 181; Ibrahim, “Literature of the Converts
in Early Modern Spain: Nationalism and Religious Dissimulation of Minorities”, pp. 210,
220.
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of taqiyya. Both concepts appear in standard Sunni texts of law, hadith,
and Qur,anic exegesis that would have been available to North African
and Andalusian jurists of the Maliki legal tradition who advised the
Moriscos regarding their religious obligations. Therefore, Moriscos
would have known of the Islamic legal justification for dissimulation,
and some of them, at least, consciously applied an Islamic discipline
of dissimulation to their interactions with Church authorities, the In-
quisition, state officials, and the surrounding Christian society at large.
In 1964, L.P. Harvey called attention to taqiyya in sixteenth century
Spain, labelling the Moriscos’ faith “crypto-Islam”. His analysis sug-
gests, however, that the use of the dispensation of taqiyya on the part
of the Moriscos was surprising. Glossing taqiyya as “circumspect denial
of one’s true beliefs when in danger”, he notes that the concept devel-
oped early in Islamic history and has been used primarily by heterodox
Muslims, especially Shi,ites threatened by a Sunni majority. He adds
that the practice of taqiyya has been thought of as an exception applying
to individuals and not to an entire community.7 Dressendörfer similarly
portrays taqiyya as a major facet of Morisco belief and practice in his
work on the Inquisition’s trials of Moriscos in Toledo in the late six-
teenth and early seventeeth centuries.8 In his 1977 work on polemic be-
tween Moriscos and Christians, Louis Cardaillac identifies taqiyya as
the Moriscos’ main defense against the Inquisition and a fundamental
facet of their beliefs and practice. Reference to the Islamic concept of
taqiyya has been described as an almost ritual obligation in studies de-
voted to the Moriscos since Cardaillac’s work.9 In contrast, Mercedes
García-Arenal suggests that the behavior of the Moriscos of Cuenca
may have had more to do with the force of circumstances than with
knowledge of religious doctrine.10 Cardaillac notes that the term taqiyya
does not occur even once with the technical meaning “dissimulation”
in the many polemic documents that he examined for his work.11 To
7 Harvey, Muslims in Spain, p. 60.
8 Dressendörfer, Islam unter der Inquisition: Die Morisco-Prozesse in Toledo 1575-
1610, pp. 131-52.
9 Harvey, “Una referencia explícita”, p. 561.
10 García-Arenal, Inquisición y Moriscos, pp. 101-02. 
11 He asks, “(...) le peuple morisque, dans sa vie quotidienne, et les polémistes, dans
leur écrits, avaient-ils conscience d’appliquer ce principe islamique, ou agissaient-ils et
écrivaient-ils en réagissant spontanément aux circonstances que se présentaient à eux?”,
Cardaillac, Morisques et Chrétiens, p. 99. 
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what extent were educated or uneducated Moriscos aware of Islamic
doctrinal justifications for the practice of dissimulation, and to what ex-
tent was the Morisco’s behavior guided by theoretical injunctions con-
tained in Islamic legal or other literature?12 Harvey remarks that the
need for a discussion of taqiyya has been felt for some time.13
Widely cited as endorsing the Moriscos’ resort to taqiyya is a fatwa
issued in 910/1504 by the North African jurist Abu l-,Abbas Ahmad b.
Abi Jum,a al-Maghrawi al-Wahrani (d. 917/1511). This legal responsum
provides comprehensive dispensation to Moriscos to feign adherence to
Christianity, allowing them to perform acts that are ordinarily forbidden
or omit acts that are ordinarily obligatory as long as they internally reject
their outward acts and understand that the underlying prohibitions and
obligations still hold. Many ordinary Islamic legal stipulations are sus-
pended: the Moriscos may drink wine or eat pork if forced; they may
pray with the Christians, utter blasphemous Christian creeds, or insult
the Prophet Muhammad if they are compelled to do so; they may dis-
pense with the ordinary obligations connected with ritual ablutions and
prayer if circumstances require; they may even marry their daughters to
Christians if coerced, as long as they retain the conviction that this is or-
dinarily forbidden. Harvey calls this fatwa “the key theological document
for the study of Spanish Islam” in the period following the Reconquista
and leading up to the expulsions.14 Particularly since Harvey’s 1964 ar-
ticle, this fatwa has been addressed in many studies on the history of the
Moriscos and the status of Muslim minorities under non-Muslim rule.15
12 Cardaillac, “Un aspecto de las relaciones,” pp. 107-22.
13 Harvey, “Una referencia explícita”, p. 562; also Harvey, Muslims in Spain, pp.
184-85.
14 Harvey, Muslims in Spain, p. 60. 
15 Harvey, “Crypto-Islam”; Cardaillac, Morisques et Chrétiens, pp. 88-90; Cardaillac,
“Un aspecto de las relaciones,” pp. 108-10; Vernet, “La Exégesis Musulmana”, p. 125;
Sabbagh, “La religion des Moriscos entre deux fatwas”, pp. 49-55; Chejne, Islam and the
West, p. 24; Epalza, “L’identité onomastique et linguistique des Morisques”; Bouzineb,
“Respuestas de jurisconsultos magrebíes en torno de la inmigración de musulmanes his-
pánicos”, pp. 53-54, 59-60; Razuq, al-Andalusiyyun wa-hijratuhum ila al-Maghrib khilal
al-qarnayn 16-17, pp. 150-51; Fierro, “La emigración en el Islam: conceptos antiguos,
nuevos problemas”, pp. 21-22; Harvey, “The Political, Social and Cultural History”, pp.
209-10; Abou El Fadl, “Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on
Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries”, esp.
pp. 156-57, 179-80; Epalza, “La voz oficial de los musulmanes hispanos, mudéjares y mo-
riscos, a sus autoridades cristianas: cuatro textos, en árabe, en castellano y en catalán-va-
lenciano”, pp. 290-95; Molénat, “Le problème de la permanence des musulmans dans les
Al-Qantara XXXIV 2, 2013, pp. 439-490 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2013.016
DISSIMULATION IN SUNNI ISLAM AND MORISCO TAQIyyA 443
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 443
While many have viewed al-Wahrani’s fatwa as legitimating the use
of taqiyya by Moriscos, others have disagreed. Sabbagh notes that
taqiyya is most important for Islamic sectarian groups, including the
Shi,ites and the Kharijis, particularly the Ibadi Khariji sect. Sunnis do
not favor the concept, she claims, since it is a dangerous principle for
the moral life of the community and weakens notions of jihad and mar-
tyrdom.16 Molénat notes that although the fatwa provides all the means
for practicing “crypto-Islam”, Ibn Abi Jum,a does not present theoretical
justification and does not use the term taqiyya itself.17 Rubiera Mata
concurs, adding that al-Wahrani’s fatwa is an anomaly among other fat-
was from Iberia and North Africa addressing the status of Muslims living
under Christian political domination; taqiyya in her view is a Shi,ite con-
cept that the Sunni Moriscos would have neither recognized nor used.18
A number of statements from Spanish authors in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries refer to the Islamic legal dispensation more or
less directly, though without using the term taqiyya, suggesting that at
least some of the Moriscos and their interlocutors must have been fa-
miliar with the concept. The inhabitants of the Muslim town of María,
near Zaragoza, rose in rebellion following the forcible conversion of
the Muslims of Aragon in 1526. The besieged rebels agreed to surren-
der only after a Christian noble informed them that they were permitted
by their own religion to dissimulate:
Sad and unfortunate people, who in this manner will deliver yourselves into the
hands of your enemies! If you refuse to be baptised in order not to go against your
Qur’an, then learn something that is permitted to you therein: show yourselves to
be Christians and get baptised, while keeping your heart for Muhammad. You will
thereby be delivered from the present danger, if you are forced to surrender by
arms, and from future dangers as you roam as fugitives the world.19
territoires conquis par les Chrétiens, du point de vue de la loi islamique”, pp. 399-400;
Pormann, “Das Fatwa Die Herrlichsten Waren (Asna l-matagir des al-Wanšarisi)”, pp.
311-12; Rubiera Mata, “Los moriscos como criptomusulmanes y la Taqiyya”; Harvey,
Muslims in Spain, pp. 60-64.
16 Sabbagh, “La Religion des Morisques”, pp. 53-55. 
17 Molénat, “Le Problème de la permanence”, pp. 399-400. 
18 “La taqiyya es un concepto de los chiíes, la más importante secta del Islam, para
disfrazar su pertenencia a ella, es decir, que son chiíes en el ámbito sunní, pero jamás para
simular que no son musulmanes. Es decir, que el escrito de Al-Magrawi va mucho más
allá de la taqiyya, doctrina que además, seguramente como sunní no conocía”, Rubiera
Mata, “Los moriscos como criptomusulmanes”, p. 547. 
19 Guadalajara y Xavier, Memorable expulsión y justísimo destierro de los Moriscos
de España, fol. 51v; Harvey, “Crypto-Islam”, pp. 170-71. 
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Here, the Christian noble alludes to a specific dispensation recorded
in the text of the Qur’an; the text reads: ... que os es permitido en él,
“... that is permitted to you in it”, referring to Islam’s holy book.20 This
may be a reference to Q 16:106, which is discussed below. Guadalajara
y Xavier refers to the Islamic doctrinal support for dissimulation when
he writes of the difficulty of converting Moriscos into true Catholics:
I only wish to state, by the way, that, with the permission and licence that their ac-
cursed sect accorded them, they could feign any religion outwardly and without
sinning, as long as they kept their hearts nevertheless devoted to their false imposter
of a prophet. We saw so many of them who died while worshipping the Cross and
speaking well of our Catholic Religion yet who were inwardly excellent Muslims.21
The juxtaposition of the terms permiso “permission” and licencia
“license” with ocasiones forçosas “coercive circumstances” suggests
a direct reference to the Islamic legal dispensation of ikrah, “coercion,
duress”, which resembles taqiyya in many aspects and may be con-
nected as well with Q 16:106.
At least one indication that the Moriscos themselves were aware of
the specific term taqiyya has been presented in scholarship to date: Har-
vey has identified a passage of a sixteenth-century aljamiado text by
Mancebo de Arévalo that provides an explicit reference to taqiyya, ren-
dered in Spanish vernacular as amonestança.22 Additional evidence re-
garding taqiyya from Sunni legal and other sources that would have
been available in Spain and North Africa during the time of the
Moriscos and in the preceding centuries will be presented below.
The situation of the Moriscos was not entirely unprecedented in Is-
lamic history, and Sunni Muslims had invoked taqiyya to justify dis-
simulation under Christian domination in other periods and regions,
including Sicily after the Norman conquest in 1061-91 and the Byzan-
tine Marches in eastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and northern Iraq dur-
ing the early Islamic centuries. Border wars with Byzantium began
very soon after the initial expansion of the Islamic Empire in the sev-
enth century and remained a constant aspect of the political and military
20 Harvey’s translation elides the text here: “... you should be informed that you are
permitted to put on a show of being Christians ...”, Harvey, “Crypto-Islam”, p. 170.
21 Guadalajara, Memorable expulsión, fol. 159; Cardaillac, Morisques et Chrétiens,
p. 99. 
22 Harvey, “Una referencia explícita”, p. 562; also Harvey, Muslims in Spain, pp.
184-85. 
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history of Islamdom until the Crusader conquests and the establishment
of the Frankish states of Outremer changed the parameters of that con-
flict at the close of the eleventh century. The Byzantine Crusade, led
in the mid-tenth century by the general-emperors Nicephorus II Phocas
(963-69) and John Tzimisces (969-76), resulted in the annexation of
large territories that had been under Muslim rule in Crete, Cilicia, and
northern Syria, including the major cities of Tarsus, Missisa, and
Adana, conquered in 964-66, and Antioch, conquered in 969. As a con-
sequence, large Muslim populations came under Christian rule and
faced difficult questions regarding religious status, religious and cul-
tural identity, discrimination, and conversion. 
Sources reveal that some Sunni Muslim captives in the hands of the
Byzantines dissimulated in conscious accordance with the Islamic legal
dispensation of taqiyya. In the late tenth century, Mu,tazili theologian
al-Qadi ,Abd al-Jabbar (d. 415/1025) criticized the morals of Byzantine
Christians, suggesting, among other things, that they did not consider
marital infidelity on the part of their wives a serious infraction. In order
to prove this, he relates an account of a Muslim warrior who had fallen
captive, feigned conversion to Christianity, and married a well-to-do
Christian woman. Later, when he was sent by the Emperor on a military
mission, he heard that his wife had taken a lover, but when he con-
fronted her relatives about this, they assured him that it was quite or-
dinary for a woman in her position to do this, adding that it was
advantageous for him, as the lover assumed responsibility for the ex-
penses of the family and property in his absence. Even if this is not an
accurate portrayal of the mores of Byzantine matrons, the account
proves that the Muslim warrior dissimulated, feigning conversion to
Christianity. In addition, he was not alone in his dissimulation:
... Musbih al-Ta,i, Abu ,Abd Allah al-Husayn b. al-Saqr, ,Abd al-Rahman the war-
rior under Ibn al-Zayyat, and other border warriors and those who resided many
years in Constantinople, both as captives and as free men, (...) because of the long
hardship they suffered and because the Muslims did not send anyone to ransom
them or to fight the enemy, feigned conversion to Christianity out of dissimulation
and spread out among the Christians and mixed with them.23
23 Al-Qadi ,Abd al-Jabbar, Tathbit dala,il al-nubuwwa, pp. 171-72; Abu Ja,far
Muhammad b. ,Abd al-Malik al-Zayyat served as vizier from 836 A.D. on, under al-
Mu,tasim (r. 833-42), al-Wathiq (842-47), and al-Mutawakkil (r. 847-51). 
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Al-Qadi al-Jabbar’s description of their conversion, “they outwardly
adopted Christianity out of dissimulation” (azharu l-nasraniyata
taqiyyatan), uses the explicit term taqiyya to denote their outward con-
formance to Christianity. It also assumes that they were aware of the
concept of taqiyya as an Islamic legal dispensation available to them
on account of their circumstances.
1.  The 910/1504 Fatwa of Ahmad Ibn Abi Jum,a 
Abu l-,Abbas Ahmad Ibn Abi Jum,a al-Maghrawi al-Wahrani (d.
917/1511), a Maliki jurist who completed his studies in Tlemcen and
spent his later career as a professor in Fez, wrote his responsum for the
Moriscos in 910/1504, probably in Fez.24 The fatwa does not mention
earlier fatwas, court cases, or legal discussions of the particular topic
addressed, so it is difficult to determine the exact provenance of its
ideas and its place in historical legal debates. Nevertheless, attention
to Islamic legal literature allows a better understanding of the reasoning
behind the fatwa. Although the term taqiyya does not appear, the fatwa
includes several related technical legal and theological terms, including
niyya “intention”, ikrah “coercion, duress”, and kalimat al-kufr “blas-
phemy”, and alludes as well to Qur’anic verses and hadith reports that
belong to the standard repertory of scriptural proof-texts used to legit-
imate taqiyya. 
24 On this scholar, see Stewart, “The identity of ‘the Mufti of Oran’: Abu al ‛Abbas
Ahmad b. Abi Jum‛a al-Maghrawi al-Wahrani (d. 917/1511)”. L.P. Harvey published pho-
tographic plates of the vatican ms. of the fatwa and discussed the text in his 1958 doctoral
dissertation on aljamiado literature, and his complete transcription of that manuscript ap-
peared in the proceedings of a conference on Arabic and Islamic studies held in Cordoba
in 1962, together with photographic plates of the manuscript folios and a summary of its
provisions in English; Harvey, The Literary Culture of the Moriscos (1492-1609): A Study
Based on the Extant Manuscripts in Arabic and Aljamía. The discussion is given at vol. I,
175, pp. 293-300 and the plates of the manuscript in Appendix C: vol. 2, pp. 184-88; Har-
vey, “Crypto-Islam.” In 1971, Dressendörfer provided a nearly complete German transla-
tion in Islam unter der Inquisition, pp. 137-41; Leila Sabbagh commented on the available
translations in 1983, making some valuable points, but did not translate the fatwa; Sabbagh,
“La religion des Moriscos”, pp. 49-55. Rubiera Mata provided a near-complete Spanish
translation of V in 2004, Rubiera, “Los Moriscos como criptomusulmanes”, pp. 541-44.
Harvey’s 2005 book on the Moriscos includes an English translation of the text, also nearly
complete: Harvey, Muslims in Spain, pp. 24, 61-63.
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2. Taqiyya in Sunni Islam
Taqiyya, literally “fear, caution” is an Islamic legal dispensation
(rukhsa) allowing dissimulation in cases of danger. It permits a legally
responsible believer to perform certain acts under duress that would
ordinarily be forbidden or to omit certain acts that would ordinarily be
obligatory. Taqiyya is emblematic for the posture of a persecuted and
necessarily secretive minority. Investigators of the history and religion
of the Moriscos have shown little awareness that a small but growing
corpus of secondary literature on taqiyya exists, much less plumbed Is-
lamic sources for discussions of taqiyya.25
A major hindrance to the investigation of taqiyya in the context of
Moriscos or Muslims in Spain has been the widespread and erroneous
belief that the concept and practice of taqiyya are the exclusive domain
of Twelver Shi,ites and other Muslim sectarian minorities and are not
relevant to Sunni Islam. Shi,ites have practiced taqiyya more widely
than Sunnis and cite the concept more frequently in their literature and
daily lives for the obvious historical reason that, throughout most of
Islamic history and in most regions, they have lived as a minority under
Sunni rule, surrounded by a potentially hostile majority. Yet while his-
torical realities have conspired to make taqiyya appear to be an exclu-
sively Shi,ite principle, the option of taqiyya was doctrinally available
to Sunnis, and Goldziher pointed out long ago that taqiyya is an ac-
cepted principle in Sunni as well as Shi,ite Islam. Even so, alleged over-
use of taqiyya became a standard part of Sunni polemics against the
Shi,ites. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), for example, denounces the
rafida “rejectors”–the common term of opprobrium for Shi,ites among
medieval Sunnis– as through-and-through hypocrites because of their
25 On taqiyya see Goldziher, “Das Prinzip der takijja im Islam”; Strothmann,
“Takiyya”; Meyer, “Anlass und Anwendungsbereich der taqiyya”; Kohlberg, “Some
Imami-Shi,i Views on Taqiyya”; Kohlberg, “Taqiyya in Shi,i Theology and Religion”; Gor-
don, “The Substratum of Taqiyya in Iran”; Dupree, “Further Notes on Taqiyya:
Afghanistan”; Fawzi, Mafhum al-taqiyya fi l-Islam; Layish, “Taqiyya among the Druzes”;
Stewart, “Taqiyyah as Performance: The Travels of Baha, al-Din al-,amili in the Ottoman
Empire (991-93/1583-85)”; Stewart, “Husayn b. ,Abd al-Samad al-,amili’s Treatise for
Sultan Suleiman and the Shi,i-Shafi,i Legal Tradition”; Stewart, Islamic Legal Orthodoxy:
Twelver Shiite Reactions to the Sunni Legal System; Stewart, “Documents and Dissimula-
tion: Notes on the Performance of Taqiyya”; Makarim, al-Taqiyya fi l-Islam; Clarke, “The
Rise and Decline of Taqiyya in Twelver Shi,ism”; Dakake, “Hiding in Plain Sight: The
Practical and Doctrinal Significance of Secrecy in Shi,ite Islam”.
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constant practice of taqiyya.26 A sixteenth century Iranian Sunni scholar
identifies the acceptance of taqiyya as one of the Shi,ites’ gravest sins
and blames them for applying it to a shocking extent, so that it affects
nearly all Islamic legal injunctions.27 Sunni Muslims have often likened
Shi,ites, on account of their resort to taqiyya, to the Munafiqun “Hyp-
ocrites”, a group decried in the Qur,an as outward Muslims who are
secretly unsympathetic to the cause of Muslims and actively seek to
undermine the Muslim community.28
Because of these polemic connotations, the term taqiyya is often
avoided in Sunni discussions of doctrine, despite the fact that it occurs
explicitly in fundamental texts in the Sunni tradition, including canon-
ical hadith collections, well-known commentaries on the Qur’an, and
other works. The relative infrequency of the term, however, does not
indicate a lack of attention to the topic or a rejection of the concept.
Sunni legal discussions of ikrah “coercion, duress” regularly cover the
same topics that Shi,ites discuss under the rubric of taqiyya, using sim-
ilar terms and examples and many of the same scriptural prooftexts, in
works that would have been well known to Andalusian and North
African Maliki jurists. Khaled Abou El-Fadl recognizes that Ibn Abi
Jum,a’s fatwa is based on the concept of duress or coercion (ikrah).29
Some Islamic legal works devote a separate chapter to the topic, as is
the case with al-Marghinani’s (d. 593/1197) Hidaya, one of the most
popular texts of Hanafi law.30 Others discuss duress in various contexts,
such as the chapter on judgeship. In addition, many Sunni texts discuss
taqiyya explicitly and in some detail.
The principle of taqiyya is based on the idea prevalent in Sunni as
well as Shi,ite law and theology that inner convictions potentially differ
from manifest statements and actions and that one ought to be judged
26 Ibn Taymiyya, Minhaj al-sunna, vol. 2, pp. 29-32. 
27 Makhdum al-Shirazi, al-Nawaqid fi l-radd ,ala al-rawafid, fols. 67-68. 
28 Adang, “Hypocrites and Hypocrisy.” 
29 Abou El-Fadl, “Islamic Law”, p. 179. For an overview of duress in Islamic law,
see Abou El-Fadl, “The Common and Islamic Law of Duress”; Abu Safiya, al-Ikrah fi l-
shari,a al-Islamiyya; al-Husayni, al-Ikrah wa-atharuh fi l-ahkam al-shar,iyya: dirasa
muqarana qa,ima ,ala al-istiqsa, li-l-furu, al-,aqa,idiyya wa-l-fiqhiyya; Abdur Rahim, The
Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence: according to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi,i and
Hanbali Schools.
30 Burhan al-Din Abu l-Hasan ,Ali b. Abi Bakr al-Farghani al-Marghinani, al-Hidaya
sharh Bidayat al-mubtadi; English translation, section on “compulsion”, in The Hedaya,
or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws.
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on the basis of the former. Intention (niyya) is a fundamental concept
in Sunni Islamic law.31 Without it, the performance (ada,) of legal ob-
ligations is invalid; the mere completion of an act does not suffice. All
practicing believers should know the concept, since daily prayer is in-
valid if performed without forming one’s intention to direct the prayer
to God alone. Perhaps the best known of all Prophetic hadith reports
is innama l-a‛malu bi-l-niyyat “works are (judged) according to inten-
tions”, which appears as the very first hadith in the Sahih of al-Bukhari
(d. 256/870) and in al-Nawawi’s (d. 676/1277) popular collection of
forty hadiths. As al-Tufi (d. 716/1316), one of the many commentators
on al-Nawawi’s work, explains, this dictum has profound legal impli-
cations. For example, a man who has sexual intercourse with a woman
whom he believes to be his wife is not subject to the penalty for adul-
tery. Similarly, a Muslim who drinks alcohol without realizing or in-
tending to do so is not subject to any penalty.32 In Islamic theology
generally, one’s conviction (i‛tiqad), located in the heart (qalb), is often
contrasted with one’s word (qawl), made by the tongue (lisan), and
deed (fi‛l), performed by the hand (yad) or limbs (jawarih). The dis-
tinction between an external, obvious, or prima facie meaning (zahir)
that can differ quite radically from an internal or hidden meaning
(batin) is also ubiquitous in Islamic literature and thought. Ibn Abi
Jum,a’s fatwa stresses that it is not one’s outer actions that make one
a Muslim, but one’s inner state or intention. God is more concerned
with believers’ intentions than their outward acts. Paraphrasing another
well-known hadith report, he states, Allahu la yanzuru ila suwarikum
lakin ila qulubikum “God does not look at your external forms but
rather at your hearts”. One’s beliefs or opinions about the law make
one a Muslim and not one’s success in applying its specific dictates.
The essence of belief is therefore not adherence to the law per se, but
in holding the correct opinions about it. Al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) dis-
cusses intention at some length in his famous work Ihya, ‛ulum al-din,
citing a number of hadith reports, including innama l-a‛malu bi-l-
niyyat li-kulli mri,in ma nawa... “Actions are judged only according
to intentions. For each man is what he intends...” and also inna llaha
ta‛ala la yanzuru ila suwarikum wa-amwalikum wa-innama yanzuru
31 Sabbagh, “La religion des Morisques”, pp. 54-55. 
32 Sulayman b. ,Abd al-Qawi al-Tufi, Kitab al-ta‛yin fi sharh al-Arba‛in, pp. 36-37. 
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ila qulubikum wa-a‛malikum “Exalted God does not look at your ex-
ternal forms and your belongings but rather looks exclusively at your
hearts and your works”.33
The concept of taqiyya is discussed in many Sunni sources that
would have been available, either directly or indirectly, to religious
scholars and literate Muslims of al-Andalus and North Africa before,
during, and after the Reconquista. The main categories of such texts
are Qur,anic commentaries, hadith collections and associated compen-
dia and commentaries, legal manuals, and works on Islamic theology
and ethics such as al-Ghazali’s Ihya, ‛ulum al-din. The Qur,anic verses
at which commentaries regularly discuss taqiyya or closely related mat-
ters are three: Q 3:28, which uses the cognate terms ittaqu and tuqah
or taqiyya and refers to dissimulation; Q 16:106, which assesses the
status of a believer who blasphemes under coercion; and Q 40:28,
which depicts a relative of Pharaoh who was a true believer but con-
cealed the fact. In her investigation of aljamiado translations of the
Qur’an, Consuelo López-Morillas provides a picture of the tradition of
tafsir that provided the background for the Moriscos’ interpretation of
the text. She identifies four Eastern and four Western commentaries as
fundamental: from the East, Jami‛ al-bayan by al-Tabari (d. 310/923),
al-Kashshaf by al-Zamakhshari (d. 528/1135), Mafatih al-Ghayb by
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209), and Anwar al-tanzil by al-Baydawi
(d. 685/1286), and from the West, Tafsir al-Qur,an by Ibn Abi Zamanin
(d. 399/1008), al-Muharrar al-wajiz fi tafsir al-Kitab al-,Aziz by Ibn
,Atiyya al-Gharnati (d. 546/1151), al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an by al-
Qurtubi (d. 671/1273), and al-Bahr al-muhit fi tafsir al-Qur,an by Abu
Hayyan al-Gharnati (d. 745/1344). Of these, she notes that Ibn Abi Za-
manin’s Tafsir is preserved in truncated form in an aljamiado MS. Es-
pecially influential for the Moriscos were the commentaries of
al-Zamakhshari and Ibn ,Atiyya al-Gharnati. Aljamiado translations of
the Qur’an also incorporated material from tafsir sources without ac-
knowledgement. López-Morillas suspects that the aljamiado writer ,Isa
b. Jabir (Ice de Gebir) consulted a wide variety of tafsir works and in-
corporated material from them in his influential but now-lost aljamiado
translation of the Qur,an, which he completed in 1456. Later aljamiado
translators or copyists of Qur’an translations may have drawn exten-
33 Al-Ghazali, Ihya, ‛ulum al-din, vol. 5, pp. 1741-57. 
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sively on ,Isa b. Jabir’s work and thus passed on commentary and in-
terpretation of the text without independent access to works of tafsir.34
Several hadiths that appear in the standard Sunni collections such as
al-Bukhari’s Sahih discuss the use of verbal ambiguities as a means to
escape harm or persecution. Legal manuals discuss matters related to
taqiyya under the topics of coercion, the duty to enjoin good and de-
nounce wrong in public, legal stratagems, and affidavits of pre-emption
(istir‛a,). Since many Qur,anic commentaries and hadith works discuss
legal matters, and since Qur,anic commentaries and legal manuals often
cite hadith reports as evidence, the categories overlap.
The term taqiyya likely derives from Q 3:28, which is widely held
to justify dissimulation in front of potential enemies. The verse reads,
“Let not the believers take unbelievers for their allies in preference to
believers. Whoever does this has no connection with God, unless you
but guard yourselves against them as a precaution (illa an tattaqu min-
hum tuqatan/taqiyyatan). God bids you beware only of Himself…” Al-
Tabari, al-Zamakhshari, al-Baydawi, and others report the recognized
variant reading taqiyyatan, a verbal noun construed as a cognate accu-
sative (“the act of being cautious”), rather than tuqatan, a plural adjec-
tive construed as an accusative of condition (“while you are exercising
caution”). Whether the actual term taqiyya or its cognate tuqah occurs
in this verse, there is little doubt that the cognate verb ittaqa refers to
dissimulation, so that, one may claim, both the term and the concept
of taqiyya are based on an explicit Qur,anic text. Most Sunni tafsirs
use the term taqiyya in explicating the verse.35
Nonetheless, the scriptural text by which taqiyya is most often jus-
tified is Q 16:106: “Whoever expresses disbelief in God after having
accepted belief [will suffer greatly]–except him who is forced while
his heart is still at peace in belief”. This verse is also the locus classicus
for the legal topic of coercion (ikrah), particularly since the cognate
34 López-Morillas, The Qur,an in Sixteenth-Century Spain: Six Morisco Versions of
Sura 79. Vincent Cornell has called attention to the exegeses of Ibn ,Atiyya and al-Qurtubi
in particular as prominent representatives of the Andalusian tradition of Qur’an commen-
tary. Cornell, “,Ilm al-Qur,an in al-Andalus: The Tafsir Muharrar in the Works of Three
Authors”. 
35 Al-Tabari, Jami‛ al-bayan ‛an wujuh ta,wil ay al-Qur,an, vol. 3, pp. 227-30; al-Za-
makhshari, al-Kashshaf ‛an haqa,iq al-tanzil, vol. 1, p. 183; al-Razi, Mafatih al-ghayb [al-
Tafsir al-kabir], vol. 8, pp. 10-14; al-Baydawi, Anwar al-tanzil, pp. 70-71; al-Jassas, Ahkam
al-Qur,an, vol. 2, pp. 289-90; al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 4, p. 57.
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ukriha “was forced, coerced” occurs in it. It is said to refer to the case
of the Companion ,Ammar b. Yasir, who was compelled by polytheists
in Mecca to worship pagan idols and deny the Prophet Muhammad.
His parents, Yasir and Sumayya, were brutally killed for refusing, but
,Ammar succumbed to their demands and thus survived. Afterwards,
when he confessed to the Prophet what had happened, the Prophet
asked him how he felt in his heart, and ,Ammar responded that his heart
“was at ease in belief”. The Prophet informed him that this was all that
was necessary, and if the polytheists were to attack him in a similar
fashion in the future, he should repeat his actions. A second account
that frequently occurs in commentaries on this verse relates that
Musaylima, the false prophet of the Banu Harith who was contempo-
rary with the Prophet Muhammad, demanded that two Muslim captives
recognize him as a legitimate messenger of God along with Muham-
mad. One prisoner acquiesced, but the other did not answer, feigning
deafness, and was killed as a result. When informed about the incident,
the Prophet Muhammad legitimated the actions of both prisoners, stat-
ing that one was allowed to dissimulate if one’s life was in danger, but
that one was also free to choose the path of martyrdom. These accounts
occur in nearly all the well-known Sunni exegeses, including popular
Maliki commentaries such as al-Qurtubi’s (d. 671/1272-73) al-Jami‛
li-ahkam al-Qur,an.36 The key phrase wa-qalbuhu mutma,inn bi-l-iman
“while his heart is still at peace in belief” appears in many Sunni legal
discussions of both taqiyya and coercion and, noticeably, in Ibn Abi
Jum,a’s fatwa.
Surat al-Mu,min depicts an actual performance of religious dissimu -
lation in the course of a confrontation between Moses and Pharaoh  
(Q 40:22-54). When Pharaoh threatens to kill Moses (v. 26), an Egyp -
tian described as a member of Pharaoh’s family who concealed his faith
(rajulun mu,minun min ali Fir‛awna yaktumu imanahu) (v. 28) speaks
up in Moses’ defense. Some commentators claim he was a Hebrew,
 assigning him the name Sam,an, Sham,an, Habib, Hizqil, Hizbil, or
36 Al-Tabari, Jami‛ al-bayan, vol. 14, pp. 180-82; al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshaf, vol.
2, p. 345; al-Razi, Mafatih al-ghayb, vol. 20, p. 121; al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 5,
pp. 13-17; al-Baydawi, Anwar al-tanzil, p. 367; al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an,
vol. 10, pp. 180-81; Ibn Kathir, Tafsir al-Qur,an al-‛azim, vol. 2, p. 609; al-Kalbi, Kitab
al-tashil li-‛ulum al-tanzil, vol. 2, pp. 162-63. See also Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion
in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the Muslim Tradition, pp. 153-56.
Al-Qantara XXXIV 2, 2013, pp. 439-490 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2013.016
DISSIMULATION IN SUNNI ISLAM AND MORISCO TAQIyyA 453
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 453
Khirbil, but most consider him Egyptian, for several reasons: the He-
brew interpretation assumes inverted word order without sufficient
grounds; the preposition min is not usually used with the verb yaktumu,
which would ordinarily take two direct objects; a Hebrew would not
likely have confronted Pharaoh in this manner; and Pharaoh would
have reacted more harshly to a Hebrew. In addition, some commenta-
tors identify him as Pharaoh’s paternal cousin, heir apparent, or trusted
advisor.37 This believing member of Pharaoh’s family is thus a coun-
terpart to Nicodemus in the New Testament, a highly placed individual
who hid his belief out of prudence. Given the salience of this passage
in the Qur’an, it is difficult to claim that Sunni Muslims would be un-
aware of the concept of dissimulation; it is presumably because of this
passage that the term kitman “concealment” comes to be used as an oc-
casional synonym of taqiyya in Islamic legal literature.
3.  Fakhr al-Din al-Razi on Taqiyya
One Sunni commentator who provides a substantial discussion of
dissimulation is Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209) in his voluminous
exegesis Mafatih al-ghayb. This analysis forms one section of his com-
mentary on Q 3:28.
Know that taqiyya has many rulings associated with it; we will mention some of
them.
The first ruling: taqiyya occurs when a man is among a large group of unbelievers,
fears for his life or property from them, and beguiles or cajoles them with his
tongue. He does this by avoiding disclosure of enmity with his tongue. It is also
permissible to produce speech that gives the impression of friendship and alliance
but on condition that he internally maintain (yudmir) the opposite and use allusive
language (yu‛arrid) in all of what he says, for taqiyya affects what is externally
apparent and not what is in people’s hearts.
The second ruling regarding taqiyya is that if the believer declares his faith and
the truth outright in a case where he is allowed to perform taqiyya, then that is
more meritorious. The proof of this is what we have stated above regarding the
story of Musaylima.
The third ruling: taqiyya is only permissible regarding that which is related to dis-
37 Al-Tha,labi, al-Kashf wa-l-bayan, vol. 8, pp. 272-73; al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshaf,
vol. 3, p. 367; Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar al-wajiz fi tafsir al-Kitab al-‛aziz,
vol. 4, p. 552. 
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playing alliance and enmity, and perhaps also regarding that which is related to
disclosing one’s religion. However, acts which result in harm to others, such as
murder, adultery, usurpation of property, taking false witness, accusing married
women of adultery, and revealing vulnerabilities of the Muslims’ defenses to the
unbelievers, are not at all permissible.
The fourth ruling: The obvious sense of the Qur,anic verse indicates that taqiyya
is allowed before unbelievers who are dominant. However, the opinion of al-Shafi,i
(may God be pleased with him) is that when the situation among Muslims resem-
bles that which obtains between Muslims and polytheists, then taqiyya becomes
legal as a means to protect life.
The fifth ruling: taqiyya is permissible for the purpose of preservation of life. Is it
also permissible for the preservation of property? One should probably rule in
favor of permissibility in this case, because of the statements of the Prophet (may
God bless him and grant him peace), “The inviolability of a Muslim’s property is
like the inviolability of his life” and “He who is killed protecting his property is a
martyr”. [It should also be permissible] because man has a compelling need of
property. For example, when water is sold for an exorbitant price, the obligation
to perform ablution no longer holds, and one is permitted to make do with tayam-
mum in order to avoid decreasing one’s wealth by that amount. How, then, could
it not be permissible here?
The sixth ruling: Mujahid [b. Jabr, d. 104/722] said, “This ruling held sway in the
beginning of Islam because of the weakness of the believers. However, since Is-
lamic rule has grown strong, it no longer holds”. But ,Awf [b. Abi Jamila, d.
146/763] related on the authority of al-Hasan [al-Basri, d. 110/728], “Taqiyya is
permissible for the believers until the Day of Resurrection”. This last view is more
reasonable, because it is obligatory to prevent harm to one’s person as far as pos-
sible.38
Al-Razi accepts taqiyya as a general principle of dissimulation in
Sunni Islamic law. He rejects Mujahid’s opinion that taqiyya has been
suspended because the Islamic state is no longer weak, and he endorses
the statement attributed to al-Hasan al-Basri according to which taqiyya
will be permissible until the Day of Resurrection. In his view, dissim-
ulation may be applied to both word and deed. One may resort to it in
order to protect both life and property. A Muslim may dissimulate not
only among unbelievers but also among other Muslims. It has limits,
and one may not resort to it when it would cause harm to others or their
property.
38 Al-Razi, Mafatih al-ghayb, vol. 8, p. 13.
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4.  Ibn Abi Zamanin’s Tafsir
One of the exegeses most frequently cited in al-Andalus was the
Tafsir of Ibn Abi Zamanin, which he abridged from the work of Yahya
b. Sallam al-Tamimi al-Basri (d. 200/815) and completed in Sha,ban
395/May-June 1005 in Cordoba.39 As part of the commentary on Q
3:28, he includes the following account of the dissimulation of ,Ammar
b. Yasir, the Companion of the Prophet who was forced to worship the
pagan gods in Mecca.
…Muhammad b. ,Ammar b. Yasir … stated: The polytheists took my father, and
they did not leave off from him until he insulted the Messenger of God (may God
bless him and grant him peace) and spoke well of their gods, and then they let him
go. When he came to the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace), the
Prophet asked him, “What befell you?” ,Ammar replied, “Evil, O Messenger of
God. By God, I was not let go until I insulted you and spoke well of their gods.”
The Prophet asked, “How did you find your heart?” He answered, “I find it at
peace in faith”. He said, “If they do it again, then you do it again”.40
In another passage, Ibn Abi Zamanin again cites the phrase “except for
him who is forced while his heart is at peace in faith” in connection
with the dissimulation of ,Ammar b. Yasir before a pagan audience: 
“Whoever denies God after accepting faith, except for him who is forced while
his heart is at peace in faith”–that is, accepts it. This was revealed concerning
,Ammar b. Yasir and his Companions. The polytheists had seized them and forced
them to denounce God and His Messenger. Because of their fear of them, they
gave them that with their mouths [alone].41
Ibn Abi Zamanin does not use the technical term taqiyya but describes
the concept and cites the historical anecdote most commonly held to
legitimate the practice.
5.  Ibn ,Atiyya al-gharnati (d. ca. 546/1151) on Taqiyya and ikrah
The Andalusian jurist Ibn ,Atiyya (d. ca. 541/1147) discusses taqiyya
in his popular exegesis al-Muharrar al-wajiz, one of the most widely
39 Ibn Abi Zamanin, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 9.
40 Ibn Abi Zamanin, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 108.
41 Ibn Abi Zamanin, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 446.
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renowned in the Maliki tradition.42 His commentary on Q 3:28 reports
that scholars’ opinions have differed regarding three relevant legal ques-
tions: before whom may one perform taqiyya, under what circumstances
is taqiyya permissible, and what acts are permitted under the dispensa-
tion of taqiyya? The interlocutor before whom one may perform taqiyya
is defined as: “Any powerful person who exercises hegemony, who
causes duress, and whom one fears. This includes unbelievers when
they hold the reins of power, tyrannical leaders and usurpers, and people
of high station in the great cities”. According to Malik (d. 179/795),
even a woman’s husband might place her under duress, such that it
would be lawful for her to exercise taqiyya before him. The circum-
stances under which taqiyya is allowed are the following: 
... fear of death, fear of loss of limb, flogging and other types of torture. If a person
is subjected to any of these or harbors a deep-seated fear that he will be subjected
to them, then he is under duress, and the status of taqiyya applies to him. Impris-
onment constitutes duress, as do shackling, threatening, and menacing. Enmity
on the part of tyrannical people of high station permits taqiyya. All these vary ac-
cording to the condition of the person placed under duress and the act forced upon
him. For many, imprisonment does not constitute duress. Similarly, in the case of
a great man who is forced by imprisonment and non-lethal beating to commit
apostasy, one cannot imagine that he would perform taqiyya, given the tremen-
dous nature of what is demanded of him. Matters of duress belong to that category
of legal question to which one must apply the law of particular circumstances
(fiqh al-hal).
With regard to the third question, Ibn ,Atiyya states, “The scholars
have agreed that taqiyya makes permissible statements of the tongue,
from blasphemy on down, also sales, bequests, and divorce, freely
making statements to that effect, as well as ingratiation and flattery”.
One justification for this position is the statement of the Companion
Ibn Mas,ud [,Abd Allah, d. 33/653], “There is no speech I would not
speak if it spared me two stripes from a man in power”. Ibn ,Atiyya
then explains that the lawfulness of performing deeds under the dis-
pensation of taqiyya, as opposed to making statements, is disputed. The
view that one may not perform deeds out of taqiyya was supported by
the early Maliki jurist Sahnun [b. Sa,id, d. 240/854], but al-Hasan [al-
Basri], Makhul [d. 112/730], and Masruq [b. al-Ajda,, d. 63/682], and
42 Ibn Farhun, al-Dibaj al-mudhhab fi ma,rifat a,yan ,ulama, al-madhhab, pp. 275-76.
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others held that acts are permissible. Masruq viewed it as obligatory
to perform taqiyya under life-threatening circumstances; if one died
when one could have dissimulated but chose not to, one would go to
Hell. Sahnun argued, to the contrary, that one would be rewarded for
bravery: martyrdom was preferable to dissimulation. Al-Hasan [al-
Basri] is supposed to have said that if a man is told to prostrate himself
to an idol or else be killed, he should do so only if the idol is in the di-
rection of the qibla, forming his intention to pray to God. If it is not in
the direction of the qibla, then he should refuse even at risk of death.
Ibn ,Atiyya rejects this opinion, remonstrating, “What prevents him
from directing his intention toward God even if the idol is not in the
direction of the qibla, when it is stated in the Book of God that ‘No
matter where you turn, there is the face of God’ (Q 2:115) and when
Islamic law allows the traveller to pray extra prayers in a direction other
than the qibla?!” Ibn ,Atiyya ends his discussion with the statement
that these are merely the main topics under the rubric of taqiyya and
that its subsidiary questions are many.43
Ibn ,Atiyya’s discussion shows that dissimulation was a well-known
topic in Sunni, Maliki tafsir and legal texts. Since al-Muharrar al-wajiz
was one of the most popular commentaries with Morisco writers, there
is little doubt that they would have been exposed to the concept of
taqiyya.44 Ibn ,Atiyya’s discussion also shows that the topic of taqiyya
overlaps, to a large extent, with that of duress or coercion. He discusses
ikrah in some detail in his commentary on Q 16:106, and his remarks
there recapitulate his earlier discussion.45 Ibn ,Atiyya presents but then
dismisses the argument that only statements, and not acts, should be
permitted under the dispensation of coercion. 
Sales, oaths,46 divorce, manumission of slaves, breaking the fast in Ramadan,
drinking wine, and other such sins performed under coercion are matters between
the worshipper and Almighty and Exalted God and are not binding on the one who
performs them. This is the opinion of Mutarrif [al-Madani, d. ca. 214/828], who
43 Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar, vol. 1, p. 420.
44 Vernet, “La exégesis musulmana,” p. 143 n. 26, states that this work was famosísimo
in the Western half of the Arab world and used by all later authors. Ibn ,Atiyya’s exegesis
and al-Zamakhshari’s Kashshaf were among those most widely used by the Morisco au-
thors of Qur’an translations and commentaries.
45 Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar, vol. 3, pp. 423-24.
46 Reading ayman for iman in the text.
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transmitted it on the authority of Malik, and it is the opinion of Ibn ,Abd al-Hakam
[d. 214/829] and Asbagh [b. al-Faraj, d. 225/839], who transmitted it from Ibn al-
Qasim [,Abd al-Rahman al-,Utaqi, d. 191/806], from Malik. Ibn ,Abbas [,Abd
Allah, d. 68/687] distinguished between what is47 a statement, like manumission
and divorce, allowing dissimulation in them, and [deeds]. He said, “There is no
taqiyya in what is an action, like drinking wine and breaking the fast in Ramadan.
For a person under duress to do such things is not permissible”.48
Again, Ibn ,Atiyya argues that one must take into account the spe-
cific circumstances and also the status of legal agent himself in judging
cases of coercion.
In my view, duress should be considered according to the resolve of the one co-
erced, his status in the religion, and the enormity of the thing to which he is co-
erced. Beating might constitute duress for one thing but not another. To these cases
there applies the law of particular circumstances (fiqh al-hal). The oath of one co-
erced, as we have said, does not bind him. Ibn al-Majishun [,Abd al-Malik b. ,Abd
al-,Aziz, d. 213-14/828-29] said, “Whether he swore to do something that is an act
of obedience to God, to do something that is an act of disobedience to God, or re-
garding something that is neither, the oath has no effect on him”.49
The early Cordoban Maliki jurist Mutarrif (d. 220/835) reports that one
may take a false oath out of taqiyya in order to protect one’s person
but not one’s property.50
6.  Al-Qurtubi (d. 671/1272-73) on Coercion
An extensive discussion of ikrah occurs in the commentary on Q
16:106 in al-Qurtubi’s al-Jami, li-ahkam al-Qur,an.51 Abu ,Abd Allah
Muhammad b. Ahmad b. Abi Bakr b. Faraj al-Ansari al-Qurtubi was a
native of Cordoba who became a renowned Arabic philologist and
scholar of the religious sciences in the thirteenth century. He died in
671/1272-73 in Upper Egypt, presumably on the way to perform the
47 Reading ma huwa for ma huna in the text.
48 Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar, vol. 3, p. 423.
49 Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar, vol. 3, p. 423. 
50 Ibn ,Atiyya al-Andalusi, al-Muharrar, vol. 3, p. 423.
51 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 180-91; Friedmann, Tolerance
and Coercion in Islam, p. 156. A similar but shorter discussion occurs in al-Razi, Mafatih
al-ghayb, vol. 20, pp. 120-23.
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pilgrimage.52 Since this is one of the best-known Maliki tafsir works,
Ibn Abi Jum,a was presumably familiar with it. It treats the following
acts, many of which also occur in Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa: praying to an
idol or prostrating to another god, praying in the wrong direction, drink-
ing wine, eating pork, adultery or fornication, usury (akl al-riba),
breaking the Ramadan fast, divorce, manumission of a slave, forced
sales, marriage, and blasphemy, including insulting the Prophet. The
collection of topics, the order in which they appear, and the language
in which they are couched suggest that al-Qurtubi’s discussion of ikrah
is part of the textual, legal tradition that informed Ibn Abi Jum,a’s
fatwa.
Al-Qurtubi’s discussion uses the term ikrah frequently throughout,
and the terms mukrah, mukraha for the man or woman who is subjected
to coercion. However, he uses the term taqiyya twice in reference to
dissimulation without expressing disapproval of the concept. In one
passage, Malik holds that a man who fears his property will be taken
by customs officers, other tyrannical officials, or attackers may not take
a false oath out of taqiyya (la taqiyyata lahu fi dhalika) on the grounds
that the legal dispensation is supposed to protect one’s person, not one’s
property.53 Another passage relates the hadith report from al-Hasan al-
Basri: “Dissimulation (taqiyya) is permissible for the believer until the
Day of Resurrection. However, God–blessed and exalted be He–allows
no room for dissimulation in killing”.54
Al-Qurtubi first relates the martyrdom of ,Ammar b. Yasir’s par-
ents, Yasir and Sumayya, and ,Ammar’s outward compliance with his
tormentors in Mecca.55 According to al-Qurtubi, the general principle
of a dispensation for coercion is subject to consensus among Muslim
jurists: “The scholars have agreed unanimously that whoever was com-
pelled to unbelief to such an extent that he feared for his life, has not
sinned if he expressed unbelief ‘while his heart was at ease in belief’,
nor should his wife be irrevocably divorced from him, nor should he
be legally recognized as an unbeliever. This is the opinion of Malik,
the Hanafis, and al-Shafi,i, with the exception of Muhammad b. al-
52 Arnaldez, “al-Kurtubi”; Ibn Farhun, al-Dibaj, pp. 406-07.
53 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 187. 
54 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 190.
55 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 179-80. 
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Hasan [al-Shaybani] (d. 189/804)”.56 This dispensation for coercion
with regard to blasphemy may be extended to other areas of the law.
Since Almighty and Exalted God permitted that one reject Him (al-kufr bihi) under
duress–when He is the source of the sacred law–and did not hold one to account
on that score, the scholars interpreted all of the branches of the sacred law on this
principle. If an act was coerced, then the actor should not be held accountable, and
no legal ruling ensues as a consequence. This is expressed in the well-known report
on the authority of the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace): “My
Community has been absolved for error, forgetfulness, and that to which they are
coerced”.57
A minority of jurists, including the Maliki jurist Sahnun, argued that
under coercion one was allowed to dissimulate in word alone, but not
in deed. Al-Qurtubi insists that this view is wrong and that Malik him-
self gave dispensation for coercion in both word and deed: “Ibn al-
Qasim [d. 191/806-07] related from Malik that no sin can be ascribed
to whoever is compelled to drink wine, to abandon prayer, or to break
the fast in Ramadan”.58 According to al-Qurtubi, one may under coer-
cion drink wine, eat pork, eat meat that has not been slaughtered prop-
erly, break the fast in Ramadan, pray in a direction other than the qibla,
pray to an idol or other god, or receive interest.59 One who performs
adultery or fornication under coercion is innocent.60 A coerced marriage,
divorce, or manumission of a slave is invalid.61 A forced sale is invalid
unless it is executed in order for a creditor to collect a debt.62 A forced
admission of debt (iqrar) is invalid.63 There are, however, limits to what
one may do under the dispensation of coercion. One may not, for ex-
ample, kill anyone, beat or flog a Muslim, or take a Muslim’s property.64
What constitutes coercion is a matter of some discussion. The
prevalent opinion is that circumstances under which one faces the threat
of death, amputation of a limb, or severe beating, or when one is thrown
into chains, imprisoned, or threatened in a frightening manner all con-
56 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 182. 
57 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 181-82. 
58 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 182-83.
59 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 185. 
60 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 183-84, p. 185. 
61 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 184-185. 
62 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 184. 
63 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 190. 
64 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 183. 
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stitute coercion.65 Others add that coercion is established not only by a
threat to one’s life but also by a threat to one’s property (mal) or the
honor that derives from protection of one’s dependents (‛ird), on the
strength of the hadith reports, inna dima,akum wa-amwalakum wa-
a‛radakum ‛alaykum haram “Your lives, property, and dependent-
honor are inviolate among you” and kullu muslimin ,ala al-muslimi
haramun damuhu wa-maluhu wa-‛irduh “The life, property, and de-
pendent-honor of every Muslim are inviolate and may not be taken by
another Muslim.”66 Some Hanafis limit the performer of true coercion
to the ruler (sultan), but Malik does not.67
7.  Ibn al-,Arabi (d. 543/1148) on Concealment of Faith
The jurist Abu Bakr Ibn al-,Arabi was born in Seville in 468/1076
and travelled to the East as a youth, studying with al-Ghazali, among
others, in Baghdad. He returned to Seville and served as judge there
before migrating to Fez in Morocco, where he died in 543/1148. With
regard to the Qur’anic passage that depicts the believing member of
Pharaoh’s family, he discusses the legality of concealing one’s faith.
Some think that if the legally responsible Muslim conceals his faith and does not
express it openly with his tongue, he is not a believer by his internal conviction
alone. But Malik said, “If a man intends in his heart to divorce his wife, it compels
him, just as through his heart he becomes a believer or unbeliever”, making faith
depend on the heart. … If a man forms the intention of belief in his heart, he does
not become a believer until he expresses it with his tongue, but if he forms the in-
tention of belief in his heart and caution (taqiyya) or fear prevent him from ex-
pressing it with his tongue, then that is between him and God the Exalted. Caution
(taqiyya) causes him to avoid being heard by others, but it is not a condition for
the legal obligation of belief to be properly fulfilled that one be heard by others.
That is only required for Muslims to safeguard his life and property.68
Al-Qadi Ibn al-,Arabi stresses that it is one’s internal conviction that
determines one’s faith, and he uses the term taqiyya explicitly in this
context.
65 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 190.
66 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 187. 
67 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, p. 190.
68 Ibn al-,Arabi, Ahkam al-Qur,an, p. 1647.
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8.  Ibn al-Jallab al-Basri (d. 378/988) on Coerced Apostasy
Abu l-Qasim ,Ubayd Allah b. al-Husayn b. al-Hasan, known as Ibn
al-Jallab, was an Iraqi Maliki jurist of the tenth century. Born in Basra,
he studied in Baghdad and became one of the most prominent disciples
of the Maliki authority Abu Bakr al-Abhari (d. 375/985). He authored
a number of legal works, including a large commentary on the Mu-
dawwana extant in manuscript, but his most popular work was al-
Tafri‛, which became a standard Maliki legal manual. One of the few
legal texts to be translated into aljamiado, it was well known among
Iberian Muslims. It includes a short statement on ikrah in the section
on the punishments prescribed by Islamic penal law: “Whoever apos-
tasizes from Islam should be asked to repent. If he repents, his repen-
tance will be accepted, but if he refuses, then he is to be beheaded. His
property becomes spoils for the Muslim community, and no heir may
inherit from him, whether a Muslim or an unbeliever. Whoever is co-
erced (ukriha) to unbelief is not subject to penalty when ‘his heart is at
ease in faith’”.69 Like some other authors, Ibn al-Jallab refers to coer-
cion (ikrah) and not to dissimulation (taqiyya) explicitly, but neverthe-
less alludes to Q 16:106 as a justification.
9.  Al-Mawwaq (d. 897/1492) on Coercion
Abu ,Abd Allah Muhammad b. Yusuf b. Abi l-Qasim al-,Abdari,
known as al-Mawwaq, is held to be the last major Muslim jurist of the
Iberian peninsula. A native of Granada, he was the leading legal au-
thority there during the final phase of Muslim rule, and he remained
there for a short time after the conquest. He wrote a number of works
on law, hadith, and other topics, including a substantial commentary
on a standard Maliki legal text, the Epitome of Khalil b. Ishaq al-Jundi
al-Misri (d. 767/1365), entitled al-Taj wa-l-iklil li-Mukhtasar Khalil
(The Crown and Tiara for the Epitome of Khalil). In the chapter de-
voted to drinking alcohol, he addresses coercion in general.
Regarding the permissibility that [a legally responsible Muslim] drink alcohol
when he is compelled to do so, Ibn ,Arabi stated that the question has been dis-
69 Ibn al-Jallab, al-Tafri‛, vol. 2, p. 231.
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puted whether a threat constitutes compulsion. The correct position is that it does
constitute compulsion. If a tyrant says to [a Muslim], “If you do not do such-and-
such, I will imprison you or take your property”, and [the Muslim] does not have
any means to protect himself from this except God, then he may commit any act
requested of him except killing someone else, for he must not save his own life
by killing another. [The ruling regarding] commission of adultery [under coercion]
has [also] been disputed. The correct opinion is that it is permissible to commit it
and that [the coerced adulterer] should not suffer the prescribed penalty for it, con-
trary to the opinion of Ibn Majishun, for he required [the coerced adulterer] to un-
dergo the prescribed penalty (...) Regarding [the commission] of unbelief [under
coercion], that is undisputedly permissible for him, but on condition that he utter
[unbelief] with his tongue while his heart is content in faith (wa-qalbuhu mun-
sharih bi-l-iman). Since God permitted [the Muslim] to reject Himself under co-
ercion, the scholars have subsumed all of the branches of the sacred law under
this ruling...70
This text demonstrates that the concept of ikrah was widely recognized
in the Maliki legal tradition right up until the last generation of jurists
operating under Muslim rule in the Iberian peninsula and was held to
apply to nearly all areas of the sacred law.
These are some of the sources to which Moriscos and their prede-
cessors had at least partial access and which include extensive discus-
sions of ikrah. Others that deserve mention are the Sahih of al-Bukhari,
the most famous work of “the six books”, the standard collections of
hadith accepted by Sunnis as canonical, which includes a short chapter
on ikrah. Ibn Hajar al-,Asqalani’s (d. 852/1449) Fath al-bari, a famous
commentary on al-Bukhari’s work, provides a detailed account of
ikrah, in many points quite similar to al-Qurtubi’s discussion in al-
Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an.71
10.  Preemption (istir‛a,) in Maliki Legal Texts
Maliki jurists allow someone who divorces, marries away a daugh-
ter, gives away property, places property into an endowment, or under-
takes some other legal act under duress to make a prior affidavit,
attested to by legal witnesses, stating that if he undertakes the specific
legal act in question at a later time he will be doing so against his will.
70 Al-Mawwaq, al-Taj wa-l-iklil li-Mukhtasar Khalil, vol. 6, pp. 317-18.
71 Ibn Hajar al-,asqalani, Fath al-bari bi-sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 1, pp. 311-26.
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This document provides proof that the legal transaction was coerced,
and when the signatory party is free from fear for his life or property,
he may have the transaction voided on the strength of the prior affi-
davit. This type of legal preemption is termed istir‛a,, and Maliki man-
uals of legal documents (shurut or watha,iq) discussed such affidavits
beginning in the fourth/tenth century. In an answer to a petitioner’s
question, the Cordovan Abu Ibrahim Ishaq b. Ibrahim al-Tujibi (d.
354/965) explains that one may undertake istir,a, “in every instance
involving dissimulation and fear of injustice and oppression” (fi kulli
mawdi, taqiyya wa-khawf min zulm wa-ghalaba).72 Ibn Farhun’s (d.
799/1397) Tabsirat al-hukkam gives examples of such affidavits.73
Many of these discussions use the explicit term taqiyya to describe the
dissimulation of the coerced party; Ibn Farhun refers to the production
of this document to annul the subsequent legal action “after taqiyya
has been lifted” (ba,d irtifa‛ al-taqiyya; ba‛d zawal al-taqiyya; idha
dhahabat al-taqiyya).74 Al-Wansharisi (d. 914/1508) also discusses this
type of affidavit in his manual al-Manhaj al-fa,iq, calling it “a contract
of taqiyya” (,aqd al-taqiyya).75 In al-Mi‛yar al-mu‛rib, al-Wansharisi
cites al-Tujibi’s discussion, also using the term taqiyya explicitly. 
11.  Blasphemy, Lying, and Equivocation
Under the general dispensation of taqiyya, the Muslim is allowed,
if forced, to utter a blasphemy against Islam, whether it be a Christian
creed such as the statement that Jesus is the son of God or rejection of
the Prophet Muhammad. Islamic legal literature includes extensive treat-
ments of blasphemy, termed kalimat al-kufr or alfaz al-kufr, literally
“utterance of unbelief”, and the subsidiary topics of invective against
the Prophet (sabb al-rasul, shatm al-rasul) and deprecation of the Com-
panions (rafd, sabb al-sahāba, sabb al-shaykhayn).76 The term kalimat
72 Al-Wansharisi, al-Mi‛yar al-mu‛rib, vol. 6, pp. 527-28. 
73 Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat al-hukkam fi usul al-aqdiya wa-manahij al-ahkam, vol. 2, pp.
3-6, citing the Andalusian judge Abu l-Asbagh ,Isa b. Sahl (d. 486/1093) from his work
al-I,lam bi-nawazil al-ahkam.
74 Ibn Farhun, Tabsirat al-hukkam, vol. 2 p. 4.
75 Al-Wansharisi, al-Manhaj al-fa,iq wa-l-manhal al-ra,iq, p. 118.
76 For example, Badr al-Din Muhammad b. Isma,il al-Rashid (d. 767/1366) wrote a
work entitled Risala fi l-alfaz al-mukaffira, and al-Qari, al-Harawi ,Ali b. Sultan Muham-
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al-kufr, which occurs in Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa, derives from Q 9:74:
yahlifuna bi-llahi annahum ma qalu wa-laqad qalu kalimata l-kufri wa-
kafaru ba,da islamihim... “They swear by God that they did not say such
a thing, yet they did utter the statement of unbelief and became disbe-
lievers after adopting Islam ...” Ibn Abi Jum,a also advises the Moriscos
that while they are permitted to lie under duress, it is preferable for them
to use equivocation (tawriya) and hidden meanings (alghaz).
Ambiguous or enigmatic speech is an important category both in
Arabic rhetoric and in Islamic legal thought. There are many terms for
such speech, including ta‛rid, ma‛arid, ma‛arid, a‛rad, tawriya, alghaz,
lahn, and malahin. Perhaps the most general term is ta‛rid, “to say in-
directly” –a synonym is talwih– as opposed to tasrih, “to state explic-
itly”. This term features in a chapter of the law termed al-ta,rid
bi-l-khitba “hinting at a marriage proposal”. While one may not address
an explicit proposal of marriage to divorced woman or widow until her
waiting period (‛idda) is over, one is allowed to hint at an offer to marry
her. This view is based on the Qur’anic verse 2:235, which uses the
verb ,arrada, cognate with ta‛rid: wa-la junaha ‛alaykum fima ‛arrad-
tum bihi min khitbati l-nisa,i aw aknantum fi anfusikum “You commit
no sin in your desires to marry women that you have hinted at or con-
cealed in yourselves”.77
Tawriya means literally to disguise or conceal, but as a rhetorical
term double-entendre, equivocation, or amphibology. It is discussed in
most rhetorical manuals of the late medieval period, and al-Safadi (d.
764/1363) devoted an independent work to the topic, entitled Fadd al-
khitam ‛an al-tawriya wa-l-istikhdam (Breaking Open the Seal, on
Double-Entendre).78 Poetry that employed this rhetorical figure became
extremely popular in the eighth/fourteenth century, and both Ibn Nu-
bata (d. 768/1366) and al-Safadi were acknowledged experts. Tawriya
refers to cases where a literal expression may be interpreted in two dis-
tinct fashions. Al-Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413) defines it thus: “That
mad (d. 1014/1605-6) wrote a commentary on that work, now published as Sharh al-Imam
‛Ali al-Qari, ‛ala kitab Alfaz al-kufr li-l-‛Allama Badr al-Rashid, ed. al-Tayyib ibn ,Umar
al-Husayn al-Shinqiti, Riyad, Dar al-Fadila, 2002.
77 Al-Shafi,i, Kitab al-Umm, vol. 5, pp. 36-37. 
78 Bonebakker, Some Early Definitions of the Tawriya and Safadi’s Fadd al-Xitam
ʻan al-tawriya wa-l-Istixdam; Bonebakker, “Tawriya”; al-Safadi, Fadd al-khitam ‛an al-
tawriya wa-l-istikhdam; Ibn Hijja al-Hamawi, Kitab kashf al-litham ‛an wajh al-tawriya
wa-l-istikhdam.
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the speaker intend by his speech something contrary to its obvious
sense, as when one says in a battle, ‘Your commander (imam) has died’,
intending thereby one of the men in the front lines”, for imam may be
interpreted as meaning “the man in front” (amam).79 Jalal al-Din al-
Suyuti (d. 909/1505), who considers tawriya similar to iham “instilling
a delusion” or takhyil “causing to imagine”, defines it as follows:
… that one utter an expression with two meanings, (...) one of which is near, i.e.,
the self-evident meaning according to custom, and the other of which is far, and
that one intend the far meaning but conceal it behind the near meaning, so that the
auditor imagines the apparent meaning in the first instance. For this reason, it has
also been called iham “instilling a delusion”.80
This of course fits Ibn Abi Jum,a’s examples in the fatwa: the audience
is intended to understand the near or surface meaning, while the
speaker understands the far or less obvious meaning.
Lughz, pl. alghaz, which also means concealment but as a technical
term enigma, puzzle, riddle, is also well known in the Arabic rhetorical
tradition.81 The phrase alghaza fi kalamihi means to conceal one’s in-
tended meaning, and the term refers most often to riddles or allegorical
language, in which the speaker gives clues or hints about an intended
word, statement, or topic, speaking around it without actually saying
it. Allegory was of course an important part of Arabic literary tradition;
Ibn Tufayl’s (d. 581/1185) famous allegory Hayy ibn yaqzan (Alive,
Son of Awake) is one among many such works.82 Riddle poems based
on the use of allusion were current throughout the history of post-clas-
sical Arabic literature.83 In a general sense, a lughz is any text that is
expressed in allusive or allegorical language or includes a hidden mean-
79 Al-Jurjani, Kitab al-Ta,rifat, p. 71.
80 Al-Suyuti, Sharh ,uqud al-juman fi ‛ilm al-ma‛ani wa-l-bayan, p. 112. 
81 Hajji Khalifa, Kashf al-zunun‛an asami l-kutub wa-l-funun, pp. 149-50; Ben cheneb,
“Lughz”. Lughz means “enigma”; it is generally in verse and characteristically in inter-
rogative form. Related terms are mu‛amma “word puzzle” uhjiyya “riddle”. Salim, Alghaz
al-Hariri wa-ahajihi fi Maqamatih: alghaz fiqhiyya wa-nahwiyya wa-lughawiyya wa-ada-
biyya; al-Ghazzi, Hashiyat al-‛alim al-mudaqqiq al-Shaykh Ahmad Sayf al-Ghazzi
al-Hanafi ‛ala alghaz Jamal al-Din ‛Abd Allah yusuf b. Hisham al-Ansari; Ibn al-Shihna,
al-Dhakha,ir al-ashrafiyya fi l-alghaz al-fiqhiyya; al-Jaza,iri, Tashil al-majaz ila fann al-
mu‛amma wa-l-alghaz. 
82 Goodman, Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Ibn yaqzan: A Philosophical Tale; Heath, Allegory
and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sina). 
83 Al-Isfahani, Riyad al-‛ulama, wa-hiyad al-fudala,, vol. 2, pp. 109, 116.
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ing. The intent in this context, however, is not to challenge the inter-
locutor to discover the missing information, but to conceal it success-
fully, as a mental reservation of the speaker.
Islamic doctrine permits lying under duress. In theology, Ibn Abi
Jum,a’s formative influence was undoubtedly that of his teacher
Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi (d. 895/1490), the leading scholar of
Tlemcen in his day and author of three popular creeds, short, medium,
and long, and a prolegomenon to the study of theology, al-Muqaddi-
mat.84 In his Muqaddimat, al-Sanusi makes the following statement re-
garding lying:
The example of a lie that contradicts conviction (i‛tiqad) is this very same state-
ment [that animals produce voluntary actions through the power that God created
in them] when a Sunni utters it in the presence of Mu,tazilis in order to conceal
his condition out of fear of them. Even if it is false because it contradicts what ac-
tually obtains, it also contradicts the conviction of the Sunni who stated it, since
he committed this permissible lie (kadhib mubah) on the grounds that circum-
stances compelled him to it. Similar to this is the case of someone who is compelled
to utter blasphemy (al-nutq bi-kalimat al-kufr) while his heart is at peace in faith
(wa-qalbuhu mutma,inn bi-l-iman).85
This statement shows that Ibn Abi Jum,a’s most prominent teacher in
the Islamic sciences addressed dissimulation and the utterance of blas-
phemy under coercion. A Sunni –here meaning a scholar who endorses
Ash,ari theology– is allowed to lie for fear of bodily harm while dis-
simulating in front of opponents who espouse Mu,tazili doctrines.
A discussion of lying that throws additional light on Ibn Abi Jum,a’s
reasoning occurs in Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, an ethical treatise by the
eleventh-century Shafi,i scholar al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058). Islamic tra-
dition rejects lying in strong terms, but not categorically.86 Al-Mawardi
cites the traditional aphorism, “Lying comprises every evil and is the
root of every reprehensible quality”.87 The Prophet is reported to have
84 Bencheneb, “al-Sanusi;” al-Saraqusti, al-Hiba wa-l-‛ata fi Sharh al-‛Aqida  
al-wusta; al-Sanusi, ‛Umdat ahl al-tadqiq wa-l-tasdiq; ,Abd al-Latif Fuda, Tahdhib Sharh
al-Sanusiyya Umm al-barahin; Buqali Hasan, al-Imam ibn yusuf al-Sanusi wa-‛ilm 
al-tawhid; Buqali Hasan, al-Muqaddimat. Les prolégomènes théologiques de Senoussi;
,Abd al-Fattah ,Abd Allah Baraka (ed.), Sharh al-Sanusiyya al-kubra al-musamma,‛Umdat
ahl al-tawfiq wa-l-tasdid.
85 Luciani, Les Prolégomènes de Senoussi, p. 225.
86 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, pp. 233-38. 
87 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 234. 
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stated that a believer could be a coward or a miser, but not a liar.88 Nev-
ertheless, al-Mawardi explains that one is allowed to lie under certain
circumstances but should use equivocation if forced to lie.
The Sunna has transmitted permission to lie in war and in mediating disputes (islah
dhat al-bayn) using equivocation (tawriya) and figurative meanings (ta,wil), but
not explicit speech (tasrih), for the Sunna does not permit lying on account of the
aversion it involves. Rather, this is [to be done] through equivocation (tawriya)
and allusive speech (ta‛rid). For example, when the Messenger of God (may God
bless him and grant him peace) had wrapped himself in a cape, stood apart from
his companions, and was asked by a man, “From whom are you?”, he answered
“From water (min ma,)”, concealing the revelation of his genealogy behind a matter
that was a likely interpretation (of his speech). The questioner thought that he
meant the tribe so designated [i.e., the Ma, al-Sama,, tribe], but the Messenger of
God intended that he came from the fluid of which man was created. So he ac-
complished what he desired, that is, to conceal himself, but was truthful in his
speech. Similar is what is told of Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (may God be pleased with
him): that he was walking behind the Messenger of God (may God bless him and
grant him peace) when he fled Mecca along with him, and was accosted by Arabs
who recognized Abu Bakr but not the Messenger of God (may God bless him and
grant him peace). They asked, “Abu Bakr, who is this?” and he replied, “He is a
guide who is guiding me on the way.” They thought that he meant showing him
the way on his journey, but he meant guiding him along the path of good. Thus, he
was truthful in his speech but disguised his intended meaning.89
Al-Mawardi thus deems equivocations preferable to outright lying, and
the methods of doing so here involve puns, depending on two distinct
meanings of the words ma, –water and the name of a tribe –and hadi –
a guide for travel in the desert and a spiritual guide. 
To Ibn Sirin (d. 110/728) is attributed the statement, al-kalamu
awsa‛u min an yusarraha fihi bi-l-kadhib “Speech is so extensive that
one need not lie explicitly”.90 One sub-chapter in al-Bukhari’s famous
collection of hadith, al-Sahih, bears the heading al-ma‛arid man-
duhatun ‛an al-kadhib “Equivocal speech is a way out of lying”.91
Among the hadith reports included in this sub-chapter is the following,
transmitted on the authority of Anas: “A son of Abu Talha died, and he
asked, ‘How is the boy?’ Umm Sulaym replied, ‘His breathing has qui-
eted, and I hope that he is relieved now.’ He believed that she was
88 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 234. 
89 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 237. 
90 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 234. 
91 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 116. 
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speaking the truth”. As the commentator Ibn Hajar explains, Abu Talha
was led to believe that his son had recovered, but Umm Sulaym actu-
ally meant that he had died.92 Similar statements are attributed to a
number of authorities. A Prophetic hadith gives the statement inna fi l-
ma‛arid la-manduhatun ‛an al-kadhib “Equivocal speech provides a
way out of lying”.93 ,Umar b. al-Khattab is supposed to have stated,
inna fi l-ma‛arid ma yakfi an ya‛iffa al-rajulu ,an al-kadhib “Equivocal
speech gives a man sufficient leeway that he may abstain from lying”.94
Ibn Hajar defines ta‛rid as speech that has two senses, one of which is
announced directly, while the intended meaning is the concomitant but
concealed sense (kalam lahu wajhani yutlaqu ahaduhuma wa-l-muradu
lazimuhu).95
Al-Ghazali includes a similar discussion of lying in his ethical work
Kitab al-arba‛in fi usul al-din, which was well known in al-Andalus.
Know that lying is forbidden in every circumstance except compelling need
(darura). It even happened that a woman once said to her little son, “Come here,
that I might give you something”, and the Prophet (may God bless him and grant
him peace) asked, “What were you intending to give him if he came?” She an-
swered, “A date”. [The Prophet] said, “If you were not to do that, a lie would be
recorded against you”. So let the person be wary of lying, even in his imagination
and mental conversation, for that might fix in the mind a crooked image, so that
the mind would give the lie to correct vision and the mysteries of the kingdom
would not be revealed in sleep. Experience indicates that this is so. Certainly, lying
is permitted out of dispensation when telling the truth would lead to another for-
bidden thing graver than lying itself, so that it becomes licit, just as carrion is per-
mitted when not partaking in it would lead to a forbidden matter graver than eating
it, which is loss of life. Umm Kulthum (may God be pleased with her) said, “The
Messenger of God only gave dispensation for lying in three cases: a man who says
something in order to reconcile others, a man who says something in war, and a
man speaking to his wife”. This is because were the enemy to be apprised of the
secrets of war, he would become bold, and were a wife to be apprised of the secrets
of her husband, there might arise from her harm greater than the harm of lying.
Similarly, sinning and enmity might continue indefinitely between two parties to
a dispute, so if it is possible to achieve a reconciliation through lying, that is prefer-
able. This is what has come down to us on the topic in hadith. Of equivalent status
is the lie of an individual to conceal the property of someone else from a tyrant, or
his denial of the secret of someone else, or his denial of his own sin against some-
92 Ibn Hajar al-,Asqalani, Fath al-bari bi-sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, vol. 10, p. 594. 
93 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 234. 
94 Al-Mawardi, Adab al-dunya wa-l-din, p. 234. 
95 Ibn Hajar, Fath al-bari, vol. 10, p. 594. 
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one else, for the open statement of sin or its revelation is forbidden, and his denial
of his own crime against someone else serves to mollify him, and so does his denial
to his wife that her co-wife is dearer to him. All this goes back to fending off that
which is harmful. Lying is not permitted for the sake of attracting increased wealth
or honor, and this is where most of people’s lies occur.
Then, when one is driven to lie by compulsion (idtirar), let him resort to equiv-
ocal speech as far as possible, so that his mind not become accustomed to lying.
When Ibrahim b. Adham was sought at his home, he said to his maid, “Tell him
to look for me in the mosque”. Al-Sha,bi used to draw a circle [on the ground]
and say to his maid, “Put your finger inside it, and say, ‘He’s not here’”. A certain
person used to beg out of meeting the prince, saying, “Ever since I parted with
you, I have not raised my side from the ground except as Exalted God has de-
sired”. A certain person used to deny what he had said, saying, “God indeed
knows I did not say anything of that” giving the impression of negation with the
particle ma [ma qultu = “I did not say”] though he intended something else [ma
qultu = “(God knows) what I said”]. Equivocal speech is permitted for lesser
(khafif) purposes, because it is justified by statements of the Prophet (may God
bless him and grant him peace): “An old woman does not enter paradise”; “We
will carry you on the offspring of camels”; “There is whiteness in your spouse’s
eyes” because these statements implied something other than what he meant.
Such things are permitted with women and children to placate them through jest-
ing. In addition, someone who refrains from eating should not lie and say, “I’m
not hungry” when he is in fact hungry, but rather resort to equivocal speech. The
Prophet (peace be upon him) told a woman who had said this, “Do not combine
a lie and hunger”.96
Al-Ghazali’s larger work, Ihya, ‛ulum al-din, includes a similar
discussion of lying in which he first presents statements from hadith
and other sources stressing the moral perils of lying but then addresses
the types of lying for which a dispensation exists.97 This section over-
laps to a great extent with the discussion of al-Mawardi presented
above. Interestingly, another version of the report attributed to Umm
Kulthum is cited as adding a wife’s lying to her husband to the three
other categories of permissible lies–lying in order to reconcile two
people involved in a quarrel, lying in war, and lying to one’s wife in
order to appease her.98 Al-Ghazali then discusses the use of equivocal
language to avoid explicit lies, cautioning about the possible abuses
of this practice.99
96 Al-Ghazali, Kitab al-arba‛in fi usul al-din, pp. 85-86. 
97 Al-Ghazali, Ihya, ‛ulum al-din, vol. 3, pp. 1020-27. 
98 Al-Ghazali, Ihya, ‛ulum al-din, vol. 3, pp. 1020-27. 
99 Al-Ghazali, Ihya, ‛ulum al-din, vol. 3, pp. 1027-29. 
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Al-Qurtubi’s discussion of blasphemy under coercion shows im-
portant similarities to that of Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa, particularly in the
injunction to use ambiguous language:
Exacting scholars have said: When the coerced person utters blasphemy, then he
is not permitted to let his tongue speak the words except by way of ambiguous
statements (majra al-ma‛arid), “For in ambiguous speech there is a way out of
lying” (fa-inna fi l-ma‛arid la-manduhatun ‛an al-kadhib). When he does not do
thus, he is an unbeliever, because no one has the power to control ambiguous
speech (li-anna l-ma‛arida la sultana li-l-ikrahi ‛alayhi). An example is that they
say to him, “Deny God” (ukfur bi-llah) and that he say, “[I deny] the inattentive
one (al-lahi)”, adding a long -i. Similarly, if he is told, “Deny the Prophet”, (ukfur
bi-l-nabi), he should say that he denies the nabiyy, with geminate -yy, meaning “a
patch of high ground”, a word also used to refer to a sort of table made out of palm
fronds, intending one of them in his heart while internally declaring himself inno-
cent of unbelief and the sin of this declaration. If he is told, “Deny the Prophet”
(ukfur bi-l-nabi,), then he should say that he denies the nabi,, meaning thereby the
one who brings reports, that is, any reporter whatsoever, such as [the false prophets]
Tulayha and Musaylima the Liar, or he should intend thereby the nabi’ of which
the poet said: “[Mount al-Saqib] would be crushed into fine pebbles * like the high
sands (al-nabi,) around Mount al-Kathib”.100
In another passage, al-Qurtubi returns to the topic of ambiguous
speech in oaths, explaining the statement, “Ambigious speech provides
a way out of lying” (inna fi101 al-ma‛arid la-manduhatun ‛an al-ka dhib).
Al-A,mash [d. 148/765] relates from Ibrahim al-Nakha,i [d. 96/715] that he said,
“There is no harm for you to say, when something you said about a man has
reached him: ‘By God, God knows, I did not say (ma qultu) anything of the sort
about you’ (wa-llahi inna llaha ya‛lamu ma qultu fika min dhalika min shay,)”.
,Abd al-Malik b. Habib [d. 238/852] explains: “This means that God knows what
I said (ma qultu) (...), when in its apparent meaning it negates having said it. One
who says this commits neither perjury in his oath nor a lie in ordinary speech”. Al-
Nakha,i said, “They [the early Arabs] would use enigmatic oaths (alghaz al-ayman)
in their speech in order protect themselves. They did not see this as lying and did
not fear breaking their oaths thereby. ,Abd al-Malik said: “They would call this
‘equivocal speech’ (al-ma‛arid min al-kalam) if it was not done to thwart a right
through cunning and deception”. Al-A,mash said, “When someone whom Ibrahim
al-Nakha,i did not want to meet came to see him, he would sit in the prayer corner
of his room (masjid baytihi), and then tell his servant-girl, “Tell him, ‘He, by God,
is in the mosque (masjid)’”. Mughira related from Ibrahim that he used to permit
100 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 187-88. On this verse by
Aws b. Hajar, see Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, vol. 1, p. 1.029. 
101 For min in the text.
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a man from the army, when they presented themselves to their commander, to
swear, “By God, I will only follow the path that someone other than me (ghayri)
sets for me, I will only ride that on which someone other than me mounts me”,
and statements of this sort. ,Abd al-Malik comments, “He intends God, the Exalted,
by his statement, “someone other than me” (ghayri), for God is the one who set
him on a path, and God is the one who has given him a mount. They did not see
that the man had broken his oath in this manner, or that he had lied in his speech,
but they disapproved of saying such things in cases of trickery, oppression, or de-
nial of a right. He who has the audacity to do the latter has sinned in his trickery,
but is not obliged to atone for his oath.102
Islamic legal tradition condones the use of ambiguous language as
a means to protect oneself from the effects of a forced oath or of one’s
refusal to take such an oath. The main scriptural texts cited in support
of this practice are the hadith reports mentioned above that present
equivocal speech (ma‛arid al-kalam) as an alternative to lying. In gen-
eral, when a man is unjustly forced to swear, his oath should be inter-
preted according to his own intention, but when he is forced to swear
after committing some injustice, his oath should be interpreted accord-
ing to the intention of the one enforcing the oath.103
The famous philologian Ibn Durayd al-Azdi (d. 321/933) penned
Kitab al-malahin in order to serve the needs of people who faced
mandatory oaths. In it he presents 183 oaths that are double-entendres
or amphibologies, the obvious meaning intended for the tyrannical ruler
or his agents who are administering the oath, and the other, not-so-ob-
vious meaning understood internally by the oath-taker. The title of the
work, al-malahin, derives from lahn, meaning to intend one thing but
to disguise or conceal it behind another statement (an turida al-shay,a
fa-tuwarriya ‛anhu bi-qawlin akhar).104 He explains, “This is a book
that we have composed as a resort for an oppressed person who is con-
strained and compelled to take an oath. He should say openly (yu,arid)
what we have recorded and hold internally (yudmir) the opposite of
102 Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an, vol. 10, pp. 190-91. Here, al-Qurtubi
seems to be quoting extensively from a work by the prominent early Maliki jurist and na-
tive of Cordoba, ,Abd al-Malik b. Habib, perhaps Kitab al-Wadiha fi l-sunna wa-l-fiqh.
See Ossendorf-Conrad, Das «Kitab al-Wadiha» des ‛Abd al-Malik b. Habib: Edition und
Kommentar zu ms. Qarawiyyin 809/40 (abwab al-tahara); Arcas Campoy, Kitab al-Wadiha
(tratado jurídico): Fragmentos extraídos del Muntajab al-ahkam de Ibn Abi Zamanin (m.
399/1008).
103 Schacht, “Hiyal”, esp. 512. 
104 Ibn Durayd al-Azdi, Kitab al-malahin, p. 56. 
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that which he puts forth externally, so that he might be safe from the
misdeed of the oppressor and escape the wrath of the tyrant”.105 For
example, one might swear wa-llahi ma sa,altu fulanan hajatan qattu
“By God, I have not asked So-and-so for anything at all”. The inter-
locutor will understand haja in its ordinary meaning “need, thing, any-
thing”, but the oath-taker will intend by haja a specific type of
thorn-bearing tree.106 The oath wa-llahi ma ra,aytu fulanan qattu wa-
la kallamtuhu would seem to mean “By God, I have neither seen So-
and-so at all, nor have I spoken to him”, but the oath-taker will mean
by ma ra,aytuhu “I haven’t struck him in the lung (ri,a)” and by ma
kallamtuhu “I haven’t wounded him”.107 The oath wa-llahi ma akhadh -
tu li-fulanin bazzan wa-ma lahu ‛indi min bazz would seem to mean,
“By God, I have not taken any cloth from So-and-So, and I do not have
any cloth that belongs to him”, but the oath-taker will intend by bazz
“weapons” instead.108 Ibn Durayd’s work was not the only one of its
kind: the medieval sources mention several similar works that are no
longer extant. Abu ,Abd Allah Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Basri al-Mu-
fajja, (d. 320/932) wrote a work with the title Kitab al-Munqidh min
al-ayman (The Book that Rescues One from Oaths).109 The Shi,ite
scholar Abu l-Nadr Muhammad b. Mas,ud al-,Ayyashi (fl. 4th/10th c.),
a native of Samarqand, wrote Kitab Ma‛arid al-sharr (The Book of
Equivocations [in the Face] of Evil), and Yahya b. Abi Mansur al-
Mawsili (fl. 4th/10th c.) wrote Kitab al-Ma‛arid (The Book of Equiv-
ocations).110
Such verbal amphibologies are also discussed in works on legal
stratagems (hiyal). Islamic jurists devoted much thought to methods of
escaping legal difficulties, and in some cases they arrived at ingenious
stratagems. For example, Islamic law requires that one offer a neighbor
the first option to buy one’s plot of land when one would like to sell it,
105 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 55. 
106 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 58. 
107 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 59. 
108 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 66. 
109 Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, p. 133 [reading al-Munqidh min al-ayman for al-Munqidh
fi l-iman in the text]; Yaqut al-Hamawi, Irshad al-arib ila ma‛rifat al-adib, vol. 3, p. 444;
al-Raghib al-Isfahani, Muhadarat al-udaba, wa-muhawarat al-shu‛ara, wa-l-bulagha,,
vol. 1, p. 300. 
110 Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, pp. 241, 333. 
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but it often happens that one could get a better price by selling it to
someone else, or one prefers for some other reason not to sell to one’s
neighbor. In order to avoid this, the jurists advise the owner to give
away a narrow strip of his land adjacent to the neighbor’s property.
Since the original neighbor will no longer be a direct neighbor, the
landowner may then dispose of the property as he wishes.111 Works on
hiyal include explicit instructions regarding the production of verbal
amphibologies, many of which involve oaths that turn on puns. If a
married man wishes to travel and intends to purchase a concubine, his
wife may try to forestall his return home with said concubine by mak-
ing him swear that he will free any concubine he purchases before re-
turning. He may obviate his wife’s wishes without breaking the oath
by swearing that he will free the concubine (jariya) but intending in-
stead “a boat” (jariya). Or he may swear, “By God, I will divorce every
woman that I marry and with whom I have intercourse (fa-ata,uha)”
but intend instead “whom I trample” (ata,uha).112 The extensive pres-
entation of verbal amphibologies in prominent Hanafi legal works
show that knowledge of such verbal ambiguity was an important facet
of Islamic literature and culture, but Maliki jurists, along with the Han-
balīs, generally condemned hiyal and considered them invalid.113
12. Tawriya in Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa
The section of Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa concerning the utterance of
blasphemies under duress has puzzled investigators. The aljamiado
translations both omit several clauses from this section altogether, ap-
parently because they did not understand the argument or had trouble
rendering the rhetorical and grammatical terms. Harvey remarks that
the text is obscure and engages in a grammatical quibble. He was least
successful in paraphrasing this part of the fatwa and admits that he may
111 On hiyal in general, see Horii, “Reconsideration of Legal Devices (Hiyal) in Is-
lamic Jurisprudence: The Hanafis and Their ‘Exits’ (Makharij)”; Horii, Die gesetzlichen
Umgehungen im islamischen Recht (hiyal) unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des
Hanafiten Sa‛id b. ‛Ali al-Samarqandi (gest. 12. Jhdt.).
112 Al-Shaybani, al-Makharij fi l-hiyal, pp. 137-38.
113 See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, I‛lam al-muwaqqi‛in ,an rabb al-‛alamin, vol. 3, pp.
91-299. 
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not have grasped the intended sense of the passage exactly. Rubiera
Mata remarks somewhat hyperbolically that the section is impossible
to translate.114 Dressendörfer’s translation, the best to date, still misses
certain points. For example, none of the translators has realized that
the phrase bayt Allah, literally “the house of God”, refers to the Ka,ba
in Mecca. Dressendörfer even complains that this example is particu-
larly ill-chosen, because the sense of the term escaped him: “Ibn Bu
Jum,a hat den Trick mit dem Genitiv des Besitztums sicher irgendwo
abgeschrieben, aber nicht richtig verstanden und dann das nicht richtig
passende Beispiel ‘das Haus Gottes’ dazu erfunden”.115 The following
is my translation of this section of the text.
If they force you to utter blasphemy, you should resort to equivocation (tawriya)
and allusions (alghaz)116 if you are able. Otherwise, “Be at peace in your hearts in
faith”117 when you pronounce such things, and reject them [inwardly]. If they tell
you to insult Muhammad, they call him Mamad–so you should insult Mamad, in-
tending thereby the devil, or Mamad of the Jews, for this name is common among
them. If they tell you to say “Jesus is the son of God”, then say it, if they force
you, and intend the ellipsis of a term in construct, i.e., “Jesus is the son of Mary
the bondsmaid of God, Who is rightly adored”.118 If they tell you to say, “Christ is
the son of God”, then repeat it, if you are forced, and intend thereby the genitive
of possession [that is, meaning “Christ is the son who belongs to God”], as in [the
expression] “the House of God” [that is, the Ka,ba at Mecca], which does not imply
that God lives there, or occupies it. If they tell you to say, “Mary is His [i.e. God’s]
wife”, then [say it] and intend the [possessive] pronoun [“his”] to refer to her pa-
ternal cousin from among the Sons of Israel, who married her then left her before
consummating the marriage–according to the opinion of al-Suhayli in his Exegesis
114 Rubiera Mata, “Los moriscos como criptomusulmanes”, p. 544. 
115 Dressendörfer, Islam unter der Inquisition, p. 140 n. 33. 
116 Or perhaps ilghaz “using allusion”, a verbal noun in parallel with tawriya.
117 A reference to Q 16:108.
118 This is an approximate rendering of the original text, which may be corrupt: ‛abd
ilah Maryam ma‛bud bi-haqq “the worshipper of the god of Mary, rightly venerated”. Jesus
in Islamic doctrine is the son of Mary (Joseph is not identified as Jesus’ father in the
Qur,an), so one would expect him to be described as her son and not the son of a worship-
per. The term “son” should also appear in the statement presented. Because Ibn Abi Jum,a
mentioned the ellipsis of a term in construct, one expects a statement of the form “Jesus is
the son of X of God”, where of X is the term suppressed by mental reservation. The phrase
ma‛bud bi-haqq occurs frequently in commentaries on the creed la ilaha illa llah “There
is no god but God”, which is paraphrased as la ma‛bud bi-haqq illa llah “There is no entity
that may be correctly worshipped but God”. The original must have been similar to the
following in form and sense: ‛isa ibn Maryam amat allah al-ma‛bud bi-haqq “Jesus is the
son of Mary, the bondswoman of God, Who is rightly adored”.
Al-Qantara XXXIV 2, 2013, pp. 439-490 ISSN 0211-3589  doi: 10.3989/alqantara.2013.016
DEVIN STEWART476
Alcantara 2 Vol XXXIV (3)_Maquetación 1  09/12/13  17:43  Página 476
on the unspecified characters in the Qur,an119–or intend “whom God married [i.e.,
to Joseph] by His decree”. If they say, “Jesus died (tuwuffiya) on the Cross (‛ala
al-salib)”, then [say it] and intend thereby that God “made him complete” (waf-
fahu), that is, perfected and honored him; or, on account of his trustworthiness and
steadfastness (sulb), perpetuated his memory and made praise of him known
among mankind; or that God “gave him his full due” (istawfahu) by raising him
up to the heavens.
Rubiera Mata notes that Ibn Abi Jum,a’s discussion draws on the
multiple meanings of Arabic root combinations, and it is this aspect of
the passage that has proved most difficult for translators to convey. The
reference to Jesus’ dying on the cross is particularly interesting in that
it is based on an elaborate pun. The common interpretation of the
Qur’anic account of the crucifixion is that Jesus did not die on the cross
but was saved by being taken up at the last moment by God and re-
placed with a substitute who looked like Jesus to the onlookers, but
was not in fact he. The relevant passage in the Qur’an reads:
They (the Jews) say in boast, ‘We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messen-
ger of God’–They killed him not nor crucified him (salabuhu), but so it was made
to appear to them, and those who differ herein are full of doubts, with no certain
knowledge, but only conjecture to follow, for of a surety they killed him not. *
Nay, God raised him up unto Himself (bal rafa‛ahu llahu ilayhi); and God is Pow-
erful, Wise. (Q 4: 157-58).
The alternative interpretations of this credal statement which Ibn
Abi Jum,a suggests are in fact puns or paronomastic double-entendres
based on the consonantal roots w-f-y in the verbs tuwuffiya, waffa,
istawfa and s-l-b in salib and sulb/salab that work only in Arabic, and
not in Spanish. The jurist seems to assume that the conversation will
occur in Arabic, that the puns should translate into Spanish as well, that
119 This is a reference to the work of al-Suhayli, al-Ta‛rif wa-l-i,lam fima ubhima min
al-asma, wa-l-a‛lam fi l-Qur,an al-karim, p. 110. The passage in question reads as follows:
“The name of the man to whom Mary suggested that he marry her is Joseph, son of Jacob,
son of Mathan. He was her paternal cousin, and the first to notice her pregnancy. Some
say that this was because he was with her in Jerusalem when her pregnancy became ap-
parent to him, and others say that he married her and when he entered upon her, found that
she was pregnant, so he turned away from her and released her, but was too chaste to men-
tion anything but good about her, because of what he recognized in her of the intensity of
her worship and her tremendous merit. The latter is the opinion of al-Qutabi (= Ibn
Qutayba, d. 276/889), and the former was stated by al-Tabari in a discussion that would
take too long to present”.
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all languages, when translated into inner thoughts, have a formal and
semantic structure identical with that of Arabic, or that the inner
thoughts of all Muslims naturally occur in Arabic.
Although Ibn Durayd does not make any specific statements about
the verbal strategies on which his amphibologies are based, numerous
examples in his Kitab al-malahin employ strategies similar to those
evident in Ibn Abi Jum,a’s amphibologies. For example, he reports the
oath, wa-llahi ma dakhaltu li-fulanin baytan wa-la ra,aytu lahu baytan,
the ostensible meaning of which is “By God, I have never entered any
house of So-and-So, nor have I ever seen any house of his”. According
to Ibn Durayd, however, by the word bayt “house” he will intend the
alternative meaning “tomb” instead, or he will intend internally the
completion of a genitive construct: bayt al-‛ankabut “spider-web” or
bayt al-nahl “bee-hive”.120 Ibn Durayd also draws frequently on the
various senses of Arabic verbal cognates. He interprets the oath wa-
llahi ma ra,aytu fulanan “By God, I have never seen So-and-So” as
meaning “I have never struck him in the lung” (ma darabtu ri,atahu).121
He interprets the oath ma a,lamtu fulanan wa-la a‛lamani “By God, I
have never informed So-and-So, nor has he ever informed me” as
meaning “I have never split his upper lip”, that is, made him a,lam
(“hare-lipped”).122 In the oath wa-llahi ma nasaha fulanun fulanan wa-
la yuhsinu an yansaha “By God, So-and-So never advised So-and-So,
nor is he proficient at advising”, the verb “to advise” (nasaha) should
be interpreted as meaning “to sew”.123 In he oath wa-llah ma akhbartu
fulanan (...) “By God, I have never told So-and-So ...”, the verb
akhbara “to tell, inform” should be interpreted as meaning “to slaugh-
ter a khubra”, that is, a sheep bought in common by a group of people
to share its meat.124 Ibn Abi Jum,a is certainly aware of these strategies
from works in the tradition, but it is difficult to identify the specific
works on which he drew for this discussion.
120 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 65. 
121 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 59.
122 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 60.
123 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 66.
124 Ibn Durayd, Kitab al-malahin, p. 67.
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13.  Conclusion
Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa may be interpreted as endorsing taqiyya despite
the fact that the term itself does not appear in the text. Taqiyya is an ac-
cepted principle in Sunni Islam that is discussed in fundamental sources
in the fields of hadith, Qur’anic exegesis, law, and theology with which
Ibn Abi Jum,a and other North African and Andalusian scholars would
have been familiar. Some of these Sunni sources use the term taqiyya in-
frequently, treating the concept under the rubric of coercion (ikrah), and
Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa does this as well, but many other sources refer to
taqiyya directly and explictly. In addition, the concepts overlap, and what
the mufti in this case envisaged was actually a performance of taqiyya
on the part of Muslims in a hostile environment, under oppressive Chris-
tian rule. Nearly all the specific examples of the fatwa, including the dis-
cussion of equivocation in cases where Muslims are forced to blaspheme,
are closely related to material found in well-known Sunni discussions of
coercion. Further investigation of Islamic literature that was available in
al-Andalus and North Africa will undoubtedly turn up additional refer-
ences to taqiyya and ikrah. Of the texts examined here, al-Qurtubi’s dis-
cussion of coercion in al-Jami‛ li-ahkam al-Qur,an seems most closely
related to the content of Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa.
What is the significance of tawriya as a means to avoid blasphemy?
If one is allowed to lie in the face of danger, then why is it preferable
to use tawriya instead? Competitive spirit and communal pride dictate
that one defend one’s religious identity. Although allowed, simple lying
is nevertheless stigmatized as a cowardly act signalling a capitulation
to the interlocutor and to the majority community. The value assigned
to courage in the face of danger is clear from hadith reports that allow
believers to deny their faith, if necessary, but reward them if they refuse
to do so and choose the path of martyrdom. Tawriya allows the per-
former to view himself as having bested his opponents in a clever man-
ner rather than simply giving in. He has actively appropriated the
language of his oppressors and twisted its meaning so as to thwart their
intentions. In a number of cases in Ibn Abi Jum,a’s fatwa, the meaning
intended through tawriya not only confounds the oppressor’s intention
but also asserts a contrary intention, countering the oppressor’s ex-
pressed ideology. This grants the performer the satisfaction of using
his opponent’s words against him, similar to the satisfaction derived
from the common retort, but here in a possibly quite grave situation. If
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taqiyya is the shield of the believer, then tawriya is his weapon, albeit
the surreptitious weapon of the weak. It is also the weapon of the clever,
which serves to avoid coerced assimilation while at the same time
mocking the enemy.
Sources examined to date present one concrete case in which a dis-
simulator consciously had recourse to the Islamic learned tradition in
order to justify and guide his performance. The Morisco Ahmad b.
Qasim al-Hajari (d. after 1050/1640) describes a difficult situation that
faced him when he was asked by the ecclesiastical authorities of
Granada to help decipher and interpret the Lead Books. He was not
only literate but also accomplished in Arabic language and grammar,
and even though the Christian authorities were seeking his assistance,
he was wary about revealing how he had learned to read and write Ara-
bic, for learning the language had been outlawed. He writes, “I asked
myself, ‘How do I get out of this quandary, when the Christians kill
and burn everyone with whom they find a book in Arabic, or who they
know reads in Arabic?’”125 He was not an old man who could claim to
have learned Arabic before the prohibition, nor was he one of the few
licensed translators. He therefore told ‘the great priest’ who interviewed
him that he had learned Arabic in Madrid from a Valencian doctor who
had –conveniently– died two or three years earlier and that it had been
easy for him to learn because he grew up speaking Arabic dialect in
his hometown. He then comments, in his account of this episode,
Everything that I told him regarding what he asked me about the doctor, i.e., that
he was from Valencia, was a lie, because126 reading in Arabic was permitted to the
inhabitants of Valencia on topics other than the religion of Islam, and forbidden to
the remaining inhabitants of the Andalus. I thus sought protection from their evil
by lying, for al-Ghazali –may God cause others to benefit from him!– stated in the
book The Revivification: ‘If a good person passes by you, and then an oppressor
comes chasing him, asking about him in order to harm him, then tell him, “He
went in that direction!”–opposite the path he actually took, so that the man being
pursued might escape the tyranny of his pursuer. Lying in such situations is per-
missible, or rather even recommended, despite the fact that giving correct direc-
tions is a religious obligation. It appeared to me that when someone who is
customarily truthful tells a lie that is permitted to him out of compulsion, his state-
ment is accepted, and what he says is taken to be the truth.127
125 Al-Hajari, Nasir al-din ‛ala al-qawm al-kafirin, pp. 18-19. 
126 Reading fa-li-anna for wa-lakin in the text. 
127 Al-Hajari, Nasir al-din, pp. 19-20. 
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Al-Hajari here provides a rare insight into the mental activity behind
a concrete act of dissimulation. He was not queried directly about his
beliefs, but many of the edicts of Church and State throughout the six-
teenth century closely associated other cultural practices, including the
ability to read Arabic, with religion and took them as evidence of
heresy. Al-Hajari justified his lies by referring to al-Ghazali’s famous
work The Revivification of the Religious Sciences (Ihya, ‛ulum al-din).
We have mentioned al-Ghazali’s discussion of lying in this work above;
the passage to which al-Hajari refers reads as follows, citing a statement
by the early Iraqi scholar and Qur’anic commentator Maymun b.
Mihran (d. 117/735-36):
Maymun b. Mihran stated: Under some circumstances, lying is better than telling the
truth. What do you think you would say if a man with a sword were chasing another
man in order to kill him, and [the man being pursued] entered a house, then the [pur-
suer] accosted you, asking, ‘Have you seen So-and-So?’ Would you not answer, ‘I
have not seen him’ and omit telling him the truth? Such a lie would be obligatory.128
In this case, at least, it is clear that the Morisco al-Hajari not only
practiced a form of dissimulation but also did so in the full knowledge
that it was permitted by principles set forth in Islamic learned tradition.
He does not use the term taqiyya, but he does refer to being compelled
(mudtarr). Al-Ghazali’s Ihya, ‛ulum al-din was one among a number
of Islamic texts devoted to law, hadith, and exegesis of the Qur’an to
which al-Hajari and others like him could have had recourse in order
to justify and guide their performances of dissimulation.
Investigation of the legal literature, however, will not suffice to il-
luminate the social history of Islamic dissimulation. Taqiyya is not
merely an abstract principle to be exercised only by those who have
extensive familiarity with the law. It is an important part of daily life,
a method that must be performed not only in a legally correct manner,
to avoid sinful acts, but also in an effective and convincing manner, to
avoid bodily harm and promote the economic success and social wel-
fare of the sectarian community. While it is important to understand
the theory behind the principle, it is clear that the theoretical texts leave
a great deal unsaid. Consideration of the social problems minorities
generally face suggests that a different approach may provide a more
128 Al-Ghazali, Kitab al-arba‛in fi usul al-din, vol. 3, p. 1.024.
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extensive understanding of taqiyya as a dynamic principle.129 Drawing
on Erving Goffman’s analyses of social interaction using the concepts
and terminology of the theater, one may define taqiyya as a dramatur-
gical discipline enabling members of a stigmatized minority to partic-
ipate more fully in a society dominated by a potentially hostile majority
and to promote the welfare of the minority community. Even a thor-
ough examination of extant theoretical texts focused on the issue may
leave many important questions unanswered.130 For a Morisco to pass
as a good Christian took more than a simple statement to that effect. It
required a sustained performance involving hundreds of individual
statements and actions of different types, many of which might have
had little to do with expressions of belief or ritual practice per se.
Dissimulation was an institutionalized practice in Morisco commu-
nities that involved regular patterns of behaviour passed on from one
generation to the next. Many of the performers were not literate in Ara-
bic and so would not have had access to discussions of taqiyya as a
legal principle. Moreover, many of the particular dissimulatory prac-
tices they adopted were not discussed in such literature at all. For ex-
ample, the Moriscos performed a ceremony immediately after Christian
baptism termed fada or fadas, by which they erased or removed the ef-
fects of baptism by washing the baby and performing ritual ablutions,
after which they would give the child a Muslim name.131 In his analysis
of the use of taqiyya by Shi,ites in Afghanistan, Louis Dupree suggests
that it is important to recognize taqiyya as both a theory and a practice:
“... it may be prudent to define the meaning of taqiyya in two distinct
ways: the way local religious leaders interpret it, and the way it func-
tions in the day-to-day lives of the peoples involved. Neither definition,
however, precludes the validity of the other”.132 There is reason to be-
lieve that Morisco dissimulation resembled that of other historical
groups, including Shi,ites living under oppressive Sunni rule, and
showed similar patterns regarding the relationship between theory and
129 See, for example, Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity;
Jones et al., Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships; Richards, Sex, Dis-
sidence and Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages; Schaefer, Racial and Ethnic
Groups. 
130 See Stewart, “Taqiyyah as Performance;” Stewart, “Documents and Dissimulation.”
131 García-Arenal, Inquisición y moriscos, pp. 56-59; Boronat y Barrachina, Los
Moriscos españoles y su expulsión, p. 225. 
132 Dupree, “Further Notes on Taqiyya”, p. 681. 
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practice. Morisco peasants would not have been able to cite treatments
of taqiyya in legal manuals, even though they were actively dissimu-
lating in various ways in the course of their daily lives. In Shi,ite con-
texts scholars complain that lay Shi,ites are not sufficiently schooled
in the ramifications and extent of taqiyya as a legal dispensation and
do not know how to use it properly, confirming a communication gap
between the two groups.133 Nevertheless, even illiterate Shi,ites in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia are not cut off from the
learned doctrinal tradition entirely and are aware of the general concept
of taqiyya and the permissibility of using it in their daily lives. It is rea-
sonable to assume that a similar situation held for less educated
Moriscos. However, in a city like Granada, home to highly literate and
educated Muslims with a local tradition of Islamic legal scholarship, a
considerable number of inhabitants must have been aware of the finer
points of Islamic law regarding dissimulation and duress.
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